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INTRODUCTION
When the sub-prime crisis, which originated in the US, began to have repercussions in Europe, 
banks started to experience a liquidity squeeze no longer being able to borrow in the inter-bank 
lending market at good rates. This liquidity squeeze had serious consequences in the financial services 
market, leading to the failure of several major banks, which were over-leveraged and heavily exposed 
to the American sub-prime mortgage derivative products. 
In order to deal with the consequences of the financial crisis and to restore financial stability, 
Member States of the EU have adopted various measures, including state guarantees in respect of the 
entire banking sector and/or individual financial institutions, as well as rescue and restructuring 
measures to allow them to bring failing institutions back to viability. An unprecedented amount of state 
aid has been notified and granted to the financial services sector since the onset of the financial crisis in 
September 2007. The Commission estimates that the overall level of state aid nearly quintupled in 2008 
compared to 2007 almost exclusively as a result of crisis aid to the financial sector.1
Different types of measures have been adopted in support of financial institutions all around the 
EU.  These measures include general measures in the form of guarantee schemes2, recapitalisation 
schemes3 and comprehensive schemes, which include any combination of guarantees, recapitalisation 
aid and other forms of equity intervention 4 . Later on, some Member States adopted asset relief 
schemes5 and schemes designed to grant banks access to more liquidity.6 In addition, various support 
measures were granted to individual institutions which were gravely affected by the crisis and needed 
to be rescued and subsequently restructured.7  These measures are unprecedented in their amount and 
scope8 and constitute a rapid evolution in Community state aid policy and enforcement.
                                                
1 State Aid Scoreboard, Commission Report on State aid granted by Member States, Autumn 2009 Update COM(2009) 661 
(‘Autumn 2009 State Aid Scoreboard’), p.3
2 These were adopted by Denmark, Ireland, Portugal, Sweden, the Netherlands, Italy, Finland, Slovenia, Latvia, Spain, 
Greece and the UK
3 Adopted by France, Italy, Denmark, Sweden, Slovakia, Slovenia, Finland, Poland and Spain
4 Adopted by UK, Germany, Greece, Austria, Hungary, Poland and Lithuania
5 For example, Austria, Germany, Hungary and Ireland
6 Like the ones set up by Greece, Spain, Hungary and Slovenia
7 The decisions in respect of all support measures are available on the website of the European Commission: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/10/411&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLan
guage=en
8 Crisis measures that were reported by the Member States in 2008 amounted to EUR 212.2 billion, with thirteen Member 
States implementing crisis-related state aid in favour of the financial sector. By the end of October 2009, all 15 Member 
States that joined the EU prior to 2004, as well as Hungary, Latvia and Slovenia have had their crisis measures approved by 
the Commission (see Autumn 2009 State Aid Scoreboard, p.4). By 31 March 2010, the amount of overall aid approved by 
the Commission in relation to financial institutions had raised to €4 131.1 bn, out of which €950.1 bn were approved in 78 
decisions in favour of some 40 individual institutions (see Spring 2010 State Aid Scoreboard, COM(2010)255 final/2, p.5)
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One type of support measure that was used to aid troubled banks merits particular attention, as it 
was organised not by the central government directly, but through the Member States’ national central 
banks (‘NCB’) and is known as emergency liquidity assistance (‘ELA’). At first, the Commission dealt 
with ELA as it would with any other type of state aid, under what I refer to as the ‘no crisis’ framework.
However, in October 2008, the Commission started to develop a new legal framework, designed 
especially to deal with the effects of the financial crisis (what I will call the ‘in crisis’ framework). The 
Commission’s policy in regard to NCB intervention was restated and made more explicit in the first of 
the Commission Communications establishing the new, or ‘in crisis’, framework. There it was stated
that general measures adopted by the central banks (such as open market operations and standing 
facilities) were generally not caught by the state aid rules and thus no prior notification of them to the 
Commission was required.9 ELA in respect of individual institutions, on the other hand, would only be 
considered to fall outside the scope of state aid rules’ application if certain conditions were satisfied.10
When considering these particular conditions and the Commission’s overall policy on the application 
of state aid rules in respect to ELA, an overlap with the theory on the lender of last resort (‘LOLR’) 
becomes obvious. Indeed, it seems that the Commission’s policy is to a large extent informed by the 
principles behind classical LOLR theory.
It is submitted here that, boiled down to the core, Commission policy seeks to distinguish 
between two scenarios: first, when the NCB is acting in its capacity as a LOLR in the performance of 
its public duties as the guardian of monetary policy and financial stability, and second, when the NCB 
steps outside of its LOLR function. State aid rules would then apply only in relation to the latter, and 
not the former, type of NCB interventions. However, as will be shown, such a distinction is far from 
clear-cut and is subject to much confusion exists as to the exact nature of, and the requirements for, a 
central bank’s LOLR function. Nevertheless, I submit that it is necessary to understand the premises of 
LOLR theory in order to be able to evaluate the Commission’s approach to applying state aid rules to 
ELA, both under the ‘no crisis’ and the ‘in crisis’ frameworks.
This paper will attempt to elucidate the connection between LOLR theory and the current state 
aid regime as it applies to NCB intervention in the form of ELA and consider whether the two are 
compatible. Part I provides a brief overview of both the ‘no crisis’ and the ‘in crisis’ legal frameworks. 
                                                
9 Communication from the Commission — The application of State aid rules to measures taken in relation to financial 
institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis, 25.10.2008 (2008/C 270/02) (‘Banking Communication’), 
para.51; for practical application of this rule, see UK Banking Industry (N507/2008) where the Commission decided that the 
general liquidity scheme put in place by the Bank of England to provide eligible counterparties with short-term liquidity 
were within the Bank’s remit as a monetary authority and so fell outside the state aid rules. The same conclusion was 
reached in respect of the initial grant of specific liquidity assistance by the Bank of England to Northern Rock in September
2007, with the Commission qualifying such liquidity assistance as ELA (NN70/2007).
10 Banking Communication, para.51
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Part II then ventures into the realm of LOLR theory, tracing back its origins and development recalling 
in particular its inceptions in late 19th Century and the subsequent academic debate as to the particular 
requirements for LOLR support. A parallel is then drawn between LOLR theory and state aid rules as 
they apply to ELA. Part III considers state aid rules and their application in the banking sector, 
specifically in relation to ELA, in more detail. An attempt to outline and analyse some of the problems 
with the approach to ELA under EU state aid rules is made. Part IV concludes, by making several 
suggestions on how the present regime could be clarified so as to avoid confusion in the area and 
promote legal certainty for central banks and governments.
PART I - OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORKS
Whereas Art 107(1) TFEU (ex Article 87(1) EC) contains a general prohibition on “any aid granted 
by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to 
distort competition”, Art 87(2) EC contains a list of aid that is to be considered as compatible with the 
common market and Art 87(3) enumerates aid which may so be considered, provided the Commission 
finds this to be the case. The Commission has the exclusive competence to make such an evaluation as 
to the compatibility of state aid measures with the Treaty and to this end, Member States must notify 
the Commission of any proposed measures prior to their implementation (Art 88(3) EC), unless such 
aid is covered by the de minimis 11 or one of the block exemption Regulations.
THE ‘NO CRISIS’ LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The first phase of rescue measures in favour of individual banks which were gravely affected by the 
credit crunch due to their exposure to US sub-prime mortgage lending through collateralised debt 
obligations (‘CDOs’) was dealt with by the Commission on the basis of the existing framework under 
Art 107(3)(c) TFEU and the Community Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms 
in difficulty12 (‘R&R Guidelines’). The new13 R&R Guidelines reflect a shift in policy towards a closer 
scrutiny of the distortions created by rescue and restructuring aid following the general trend of “less 
                                                
11 Regulation No 1998/2006 of 15.12.2006, OJ L 379, 28.12.06, p.6
12 Community Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty [2004] OJ C 244, 1.10.2004, p.2 
(‘R&R Guidelines’); 
13 The R&R Guidelines currently in force are the revised version of the Guidelines that were adopted in 1999 (OJ C 288, 
p.2), which were in turn a revised version of the original Guidelines adopted in 1994 (OJ C 368, p12) and amended in 1997 
(OJ C 283, p.2) to include some specific rules for agriculture.
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and better targeted state aid” as called upon by the European Council 14 . In general terms, the 
Guidelines reinforce the “one time, last time” principle and preserve the transitional character of rescue 
aid, which is designed to provide a firm in difficulty with an opportunity to work out a restructuring 
plan so as to return the firm to viability and not to keep it afloat with state resources indefinitely. The 
Guidelines also require the beneficiary of restructuring aid to make a substantial contribution, which is 
real and free of aid, so as to ensure that restructuring is limited to the minimum necessary to restore the 
firm’s viability and to limit distortion of competition. These Guidelines apply to rescue and 
restructuring measures in respect of firms in difficulty, i.e. where the firm in question “is unable, 
whether through its own resources or with the funds it is able to obtain from its owner/shareholders or 
creditors, to stem losses which, without outside intervention by the public authorities, will almost 
certainly condemn it to going out of business in the short or medium term.”15 The Guidelines identify 
Art 87(3)(c) of the EC Treaty as “the only basis on which aid for firms in difficulty can be deemed 
compatible” 16 . Art 87(3)(c) provides that “aid to facilitate the development of certain economic 
activities […], where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the 
common interest” may be considered to be compatible with the common market. Thus, state aid may be 
considered compatible with the common market where the aid is necessary to correct disparities caused 
by market failures or to ensure economic and social cohesion 17.  
Several of these measures were approved under the old framework on the basis of Art 107(3)(c) 
TFEU , including rescue aids granted by Denmark to Roskilde Bank18, by Germany to Hypo Real 
Estate Holding19 and the UK’s rescue package to Bradford & Bingley20. 
To illustrate the application of this legal framework to ELA granted by national central banks, two 
case studies are presented here: UK rescue aid to Northern Rock, the first ELA-related case that was 
considered during the financial crisis 2007-2009, and Denmark’s rescue aid to Roskilde Bank. 
Although both of these cases deal with a variety of rescue measures, the case studies are presented only 
in relation to emergency liquidity assistance.
                                                
14 Conclusions of the European Council in Lisbon, March 14-23, 2000. See XXXII Report on Competition Policy, p.6; see 
also Thibaut Kleiner, “Reforming state aid policy to best contribute to the Lisbon Strategy for growth and jobs” (2005) 2 
Competition Policy Newsletter 29
15 R&R Guidelines, paras. 9-10
16 R&R Guidelines, at para. 19
17 R&R Guidelines, at para. 19
18 N 366/2008 Rescue aid to Roskilde Bank, decision not to raise objections (IP/08/1222) dated 31 July 2008. Note, 
however, that rescue aid to Roskilde Bank was never implemented. Instead, the Danish authorities have submitted a plan to 
liquidate the bank, which was approved by the Commission: NN 39/2008 Liquidation aid to Roskilde Bank, decision not to 
raise objections (IP/08/1633) dated 5 November 2008
19 NN 44/2008 Rescue aid to Hypo Real Estate Holding, decision not to raise objections (IP/08/1453) dated 2 October 2008
20 NN 41/2008 Rescue aid to Bradford and Bingley, decision not to raise objections (IP/08/1437) dated 1 October 2008
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CASE STUDY 1: NORTHERN ROCK21
As the credit crisis spread across the pond to the UK, many of its banks found themselves exposed 
to the quickly-depreciating CDOs. The British mortgage lender Northern Rock was one of the 
institutions most heavily invested in the American subprime mortgage market and soon found itself in 
financial trouble. Northern Rock requested support from the Bank of England as it was unable to meet 
its funding needs on the private markets and was at risk of going into administration, with the Bank of 
England having previously made clear that it will not grant ELA until it was confirmed that no private 
investor solution would be possible.22 However, in order to grant the requested liquidity assistance to 
Northern Rock, the Bank of England had to deviate from the framework for its operations in the 
sterling money markets as it is set out in the ‘Red Book’ and obtain authorisation from the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer under the provisions set out in para.14 of the Memorandum of Understanding.23
Having obtained the necessary authorisation from the Chancellor of the Exchequer24, the Bank of 
England granted ELA to Northern Rock on 14 September25 in the form of a Loan Agreement and a 
Repo Facility, on the following conditions 26: both facilities were (i) uncommitted and repayable on 
demand, (ii) required the provision of high quality collateral or securities, to which (iii) margins 
("haircuts") were applied to protect the Bank against the risk of falls in the price of collateral, which 
was assessed daily, and (iv) the rate of interest was fixed above the Bank of England’s official rate and 
above the rate of its standing facility with the financial markets, which made it above the reference rate 
for the UK (and in other words, a “penal interest rate”). 
In its decision, the Commission considered these conditions and the fact that these measures were 
taken at the Bank of England’s own initiative when Northern Rock was still solvent, to conclude that 
these measures did not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU .27
                                                
21 NN 70/2007 (ex CP 269/07) – United Kingdom Rescue aid to Northern Rock, 05.XII.2007 C(2007) 6127 final
22 Ibid., paras.5-7
23 Ibid, para.8; the Memorandum of Understanding between the Treasury, the Bank of England and the FSA sets out in 
para.14  the exception on financial crisis management: “In exceptional circumstances, there may be a need for an operation 
which goes beyond the Bank’s published framework for operations in the money market. Such a support operation […] 
would normally only be undertaken in the case of a genuine threat to the stability of the financial system to avoid a serious 
disturbance in the UK economy. If the Bank or the FSA identified a situation where such a support operation might become 
necessary, they would immediately inform the other authorities and invoke the co-ordination framework outlined in 
paragraph 16 below. Ultimate responsibility for authorisation of support operations in exceptional circumstances rests with 
the Chancellor. Thereafter they would keep the Treasury informed about the developing situation, as far as circumstances 
allowed.”
24 NN 70/2007 Northern Rock, para.8
25 Ibid, para.9
26 Ibid, paras.11-14
27 Ibid., paras.32-34
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However, Northern Rock’s woes did not stop there and were actually exacerbated by a bank run 
when the details of this support measures were leaked to the press one day before they were actually 
implemented and publicly announced. In order to stop the bank run and avoid contagion effects 
spreading in the market and causing a wider banking crisis, the Treasury took further measures, 
including a guarantee backed by State resources for all existing accounts in Northern Rock on 20 
September28, which was later extended on 9 October together with a modification of the ELA facility 
with the Bank of England.29 Thus, at the request of the Treasury, the Bank of England made additional 
funding facilities available, with the Treasury undertaking to indemnify the latter for any liabilities that 
may arise.30 The Commission considered that these measures constituted state aid since they fulfilled 
all the conditions laid down in Article 107(1) TFEU , and in particular, because no market economy 
investor would have granted them.31
When considering compatibility under Art.107(3)(b) TFEU , the Commission noted that according 
to its long-standing case law (in particular relying on Crédit Lyonnais), this provision cannot be 
invoked in relation to one single market operator, since it was “designed to remedy serious economic 
disruption” and applied only to “the acute problems facing all operators in the industry” as opposed to a 
single operator like Crédit Lyonnais or Northern Rock.32 Moreover, it did not consider UK’s fears of a 
systemic crisis arising justified, as it deemed the information provided by the UK authorities 
insufficient to arrive at such a conclusion.33
In its assessment of compatibility under Art.107(3)(c) TFEU , the Commission concluded that 
Northern Rock qualified as a ‘firm in difficulty’ 34 , that the aid fulfilled all five conditions for 
compatible rescue aid as these are stipulated in point 25 of the R&R Guidelines35 and was therefore aid 
compatible with the common market.36
CASE STUDY 2: ROSKILDE BANK37
An emergency liquidity facility was at stake also in the Roskilde Bank case. It was provided by 
the Danish National Bank in the form of a loan for an unlimited amount and could be cancelled by the 
                                                
28 Ibid., para.9
29 Ibid., para.10
30 Ibid., paras.17-19
31 Ibid., para.35
32 Ibid., para.38
33 Ibid., para.38
34 Ibid., para.41
35 Ibid., paras.42-52
36 Ibid., para.53
37 State aid NN 36/2008 – Denmark Roskilde Bank, 31.07.2008 C(2008)4138 published in OJ C 238/5 on 17.09.2008
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central bank at any time.38 The floating interest rate was set at 6.6% which was fixed at 200 basis 
points over the Danish National Bank’s ordinary interest rate for loans and was also above the 
reference rate for rescue aid in Denmark.39 However, as Roskilde Bank would not have been able to 
provide sufficient collateral for the liquidity facility, it was instead secured by two guarantees: one, 
which guarantees any potential losses for up to DKK 750 million by Det Private Beredskab, a 
voluntary-membership association created by the Danish Bankers Association, and the other, which 
covers any further losses not covered by the first guarantee, is provided by the State.40
In its assessment of the guarantee provided by Det Private Beredskab, the Commission 
considered that no State resources were involved in the financing of the guarantee provided by Det 
Private Beredskab for the following reasons41: (i) participation in Det Private Beredskab  was voluntary
and of a private nature; (ii) the members of the highest authority of Det Private Beredskab are private, 
and the private bank members in the decision-making body could exercise a power of veto; (iii) the 
members of Det Private Beredskab have a lower exposure under the guarantee compared to their 
potential obligations under the Deposit Guarantee Fund. Therefore, the Commission concluded that it 
did not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU . 
In its assessment of the part of the liquidity facility which was guaranteed by the private sector, 
the Commission considered the following in relation to the requirement of ‘state resources’: firstly, it 
observed that the Danish State is the sole shareholder of the Danish National Bank and secondly, since 
the Danish National Bank has to be considered as a public authority or a public body, the imputability 
to the State of the use of State resources need not be shown separately. Moreover, the measure was 
taken in a coordinated action with the State. Therefore, it concluded that State resources were involved 
in the provision of liquidity by the Danish National Bank. 42 The ‘selectivity’ criterion was also 
considered as fulfilled, since the measure was of an ad hoc measure in favour of one beneficiary, which 
the Danish National Bank granted by deviating from its set-up framework, and over which it had 
considerable discretion when deciding whether to grant it and at what conditions.43 In view of the 
special characteristics of the banking sector, the Commission concluded that this ELA measure was 
susceptible to distort competition and affect trade between Member States.44 Nevertheless, it decided 
that the part of the measure that was guaranteed by Det Private Beredskab did not constitute aid within 
                                                
38 Ibid., paras.14-15
39 Ibid., para.18
40 Ibid., paras.19-24
41 Ibid., paras.25-31
42 Ibid., para.32
43 Ibid., para.32
44 Ibid., para.32
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the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU , because it did not involve the grant of an advantage from state 
resources. The reasoning behind was the following: (i) the interest rate charged for this liquidity facility 
was 2% higher than the lending rate of the Danish National Bank; (ii) the guarantee provided by Det 
Private Beredskab was of a private nature, and (iii) it provided a highly secure coverage for the Danish 
National Bank’s exposure to the beneficiary’s credit risk in respect of the liquidity facility, since Det
Private Beredskab would pay the Danish National Bank under the guarantee should Roskilde Bank fail 
to comply with its repayment obligations, regardless of whether any liquidation proceedings are 
initiated against it. Therefore, no advantage was considered to be involved, with both the Danish 
National Bank and the State acting as a prudent market economy lender would do under the 
circumstances.45
In its assessment of the part of the ELA facility that was guaranteed by the government, the 
Commission concluded that since this guarantee (i) was granted without a fee or any collateral, (ii) for 
an unlimited amount, (iii) conferred a selective advantage provided from State resources and (iv) had 
the potential to distort competition and affect trade between Member States, it constitute state aid 
within the meaning of Art.107(3)(b) TFEU . 46 However, given that Roskilde Bank was a firm in 
difficulty, that the measure was designed to ensure that the loan could only be used by the bank to 
conduct its present day-today activities and not to invest in new activities or behave aggressively in 
commercial markets, and, moreover, that that there were sufficient guarantees in place to ensure that 
the aid amount was limited to the minimum necessary, the Commission concluded that the measure 
constituted rescue aid compatible with the common market under Art.107(3)(c) TFEU .47
THE ‘IN CRISIS’ FRAMEWORK
In early autumn of 2008 it became apparent that the framework in place until then became 
inadequate to deal with the effects of the spreading crisis, especially after the failure of Lehman 
Brothers in the US with significant consequences for European banks. Therefore, the European 
Commission introduced a new and temporary framework with the adoption of the Banking 
Communication in October 2008, speeding up the procedure for the assessment of compatibility of 
proposed national measures and introducing Article 107(3)(b) TFEU as a legal basis available to the 
Member States in the current market turbulence.
                                                
45 Ibid., para.32
46 Ibid., paras.35-38
47 Ibid., paras.42-65
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The Banking Communication and the new legal framework
In the Banking Communication, the Commission recognised that given the level of seriousness of 
the financial crisis and its impact on the financial markets and the overall economy of Member States, 
Article 87(3)(b) is available as a legal basis for aid measures undertaken to address this systemic 
crisis48. The Commission warned, however, that this legal basis is not to be used as a matter of 
principle in crisis situations in other individual sectors “in the absence of a comparable risk that they 
have an immediate impact on the economy of a Member State as a whole”49. According to the 
European Court of Justice (‘ECJ’), in order to invoke this provision, “the disturbance in question must 
affect the whole of the economy of the Member State concerned, and not merely that of one of its 
regions or parts of its territory”50. Indeed, there is only one precedent for the successful use of Art 
107(3)(b) TFEU in the case concerning economic reforms and a stabilisation programme introduced 
by the Greek government in the 1980’s51.
Apart from this new legal basis, the Banking Communication also introduced a distinction between 
financial institutions characterised by “endogenous problems” (i.e. those banks whose inefficiency or 
excessive risk-taking are the root cause of their woes, exacerbated or brought to light by the financial 
crisis) and financial institutions with “exogenous problems” (i.e. illiquid but otherwise fundamentally 
sound banks institutions which are in difficulty solely because of the financial crisis). The 
Communication is concerned predominantly with guarantee schemes (until then the most common 
measure resorted to by Member States, as will be discussed below), as well as recapitalisation measures, 
controlled winding-up of financial institutions and other forms of liquidity assistance. The general 
conditions which must be fulfilled for aid to be considered as compatible with EU rules on state aid are 
the following: (i) non-discriminatory access to support measures (i.e. eligibility should not be based on 
nationality); state support must be limited in (ii) time and (iii) scope to what is necessary to address the 
acute crisis; there must be (iv) an appropriate contribution by the private sector, including an adequate 
remuneration, and (v) sufficient behavioural rules must be in place to prevent the beneficiary of aid 
                                                
48 Banking Communication, para. 9
49 Banking Communication, OJ C 270, 5.10.2008, pp.8-14, at para. 11
50 Joined Cases T-132/96 and T-143/96 Freistaat Sachsen and Volkswagen AG v Commission [1999] ECR II-3663, para. 
167; see also Commission Decision 98/490/EC in Case C 47/96 Crédit Lyonnais (OJ L 221, 8.8.1998, p. 28), point 10.1, 
Commission Decision 2005/345/EC in Case C 28/02 Bankgesellschaft Berlin (OJ L 116, 4.5.2005, p. 1), points 153 et seq. 
and Commission Decision 2008/263/EC in Case C 50/06 BAWAG (OJ L 83, 26.3.2008, p. 7), point 166.
51 Commission decision 8/167/EEC of 7.10.1987 concerning Law 1386/1983 by which the Greek government granted aid to 
the Greek industry.
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from abusing State support. Moreover, structural adjustments should be made, as appropriate, including 
restructurings of firms receiving state aid, and measures granted should be regularly reviewed.
The Recapitalisation Communication
As the crisis continued to rampage through financial markets and the inter-bank lending markets 
dried up, severe repercussions began to be felt elsewhere: banks, no longer secure about their own 
assets and unable to borrow, stopped lending to commercial and retail clients. The Commission 
responded to this need by issuing a Recapitalisation Communication52 on 5 December 2008, in which a 
set of standards and safeguards was identified to allow Member States to recapitalise banks in order to 
ensure that adequate levels of lending to the economy ensued. The Communication places a particular 
emphasis on two principles to ensure the avoidance of undue distortion of competition: (i) 
remuneration close to market prices; and (ii) temporary character of recapitalisation, with incentives for 
State capital redemption favouring an early return to normal functioning of the market. 53 The 
Recapitalisation Communication goes hand in hand with the Banking Communication, making inter 
alia the same distinction between endogenously and exogenously troubled banks.
Impaired Assets Communication
As the market value of portfolio investments held by banks kept decreasing and the effects of the 
“toxic” or impaired assets associated with the US sub-prime mortgage and derivative products thereof 
continued to be felt, there arose a need for a way to dispose of such toxic assets to unburden the 
troubled banks from the uncertainty as to the location and the size of losses potentially stemming from 
impaired assets. The Commission responded by adopting the Impaired Assets Communication54 on 25 
February 2009. This Communication provides a set of principles according to which impaired assets 
relief measures will be assessed, including principles relating to disclosure of impaired assets prior to 
government intervention, their identification, valuation, as well as adequate burden-sharing of related 
costs between the shareholders, creditors and the State and adequate remuneration for the State.
                                                
52 Communication from the Commission on the recapitalization of financial institutions in the current financial crisis:  
imitation of the aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards against undue distortions of competition, OJ C 10, 
15.01.2009, pp.2-10 (‘Recapitalisation Communication’)
53 For a summary of the main points see Report from the Commission: State Aid Scoreboard – Spring 2009 Update, COM 
(2009) 164, 08.04.2009, p.202
54 Communication form the Commission on the treatment of impaired assets in the Community banking sector, OJ C 72, 
26.03.2009, p.1 (‘Impaired Assets Communication’)
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Restructuring Communication
On 23 July 2009 the Commission issued the Restructuring Communication55, in which it explains 
its approach to assessing restructuring aid given by Member States to the banks during the financial 
crisis notified to it before 31 December 2010. Under these guidelines, the Member States are required to 
submit a ‘viability plan’ for fundamentally sound banks, or a more in-depth ‘restructuring plan’ for banks in 
difficulties, in order to confirm or re-establish individual banks’ long-term viability without reliance on 
State support. 56 The Commission will then assess the restructuring based on three fundamental 
principles: (i) aided banks must be returned to viability in the long term without further state support, 
(ii) with the beneficiaries making an own contribution to the restructuring costs (“burden sharing”), (iii) 
whilst limiting distortions of competition and ensuring a competitive banking sector in the Single 
Market. Thus, this Communication continues in line with the previous three Communications in 
maintaining the distinction between “fundamentally sound” and “structurally unsound” banks and the goal 
of striving to maintain financial stability without harming the level-playing field in the single market.57
The measures that were assessed under the new framework include rescue aid in the form of a 
capital injection into SNS Reaal/New58 by the Dutch authorities, the joint rescue and restructuring 
scheme for Fortis59 designed by Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, the capital injection into 
Ethias60 by the Belgian authorities, Latvian support measures for Parex Banka61 and the Swedish 
emergency rescue measures in favour of Carnegie Sweden.62 The following case study on rescue aid to 
the Swedish Carnegie Bank provides an illustration of how the Commission applies this new ‘in crisis’ legal 
framework to ELA.
CASE STUDY 3: CARNEGIE BANK63
                                                
55 Communication from the Commission "The return to viability and the assessment of restructuring measures in the 
financial sector in the current crisis under the State aid rules" Official Journal C195, 19.8.2009, p. 9 (‘Restructuring 
Communication’)
56 Ibid., para.4
57 Ibid., para.29
58 N 611/2008 SNS Reaal/New capital injection by Dutch authorities, (IP/08/1951) of 10 December 2008
59 N 574/2008 Measures in favour of Fortis, (IP/08/1746) of 19 November 2008
60 NN57/2008 Capital injection for Ethias group, decision not to raise objections (IP/09/254) of 12 February 2009
61 NN 68/2008 Support measures for JSC Parex Banka, (IP/08/1766) of 24 November 2008
62 NN 64/2008 Emergency rescue measures regarding Carnegie Investment Bank, (IP/08/1977) of 15 December 2008
63 NN 64/2008 – Sweden Rescue aid to Carnegie Bank, 15.12.2008 C(2008) 8660
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Sweden’s Carnegie Bank found itself in increasing financial difficulties, not being able to 
finance itself on the interbank market and, following the publication of its third quarter report of 2008 
which revealed some unfavourable investments with an exceptionally large credit exposure, and, 
finding itself being investigated by Sweden’s Financial Services Authority and at risk of losing its 
banking license, it turned to Sweden’s central bank, the Riksbank, for emergency liquidity assistance.64
This ELA was granted to Carnegie in the form of a loan, with an interest rate 150 basis points above 
Riksbank’s repo rate, and against collateral, which consisted of shares in Carnegie Bank’s subsidiaries 
and in Carnegie Bank itself.65
Recalling the criteria it has set out in its Banking Communication,66 the Commission considered 
that these were not satisfied in the present case. In particular, given that the ELA was secured by 
collateral that consisted mainly of shares in the beneficiary and its subsidiaries, the value of which was 
subject to market fluctuations and which would not have normally been accepted as security by a 
central bank, this collateral was not deemed as adequate under the conditions set out in the Banking 
Communication.67 Therefore the measure constituted an advantage and was, moreover, selective in 
nature as it applied only to Carnegie Bank, and, given the intense exchanges in banking and financial 
services and the beneficiary’s presence on the four Nordic markets, was liable to distort competition 
and affect trade between Member States. 68 Riksbank’s resources were also deemed to be ‘State 
resources’ imputable to the State for the purposes of state aid rules, since the central bank was 
established by the Swedish constitution, with its operations governed by a special law and its board of 
governors appointed by Parliament. The ELA measure was therefore considered to constitute State aid 
within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU .69
In regard to compatibility, the Commission agreed to apply Article 107(3)(b) TFEU since the 
failure of Carnegie Bank would have entailed a serious disturbance in Sweden’s economy, given the 
fact that the beneficiary had important international operations and the default on its payments may 
have had detrimental effects on Swedish economy in which, because of its relatively small size, the 
counterparties do not tend to distinguish between individual banks and the lack of confidence in respect 
to one of them, Carnegie, would have extended to the others.70 The Commission therefore set out to 
apply the compatibility in line with the Banking Communication and decided that the aid was: (a) 
                                                
64 Ibid., paras.8-9
65 Ibid., paras.10 and 26
66 See the Banking Communication; NN 70/2007 Northern Rock.
67 NN 64/2008 Carnegie Bank, para.26
68 Ibid., para.27
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid., paras.32-34
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appropriate, in being well-targeted to address the cause of the beneficiary’s problem, namely its 
inability to refinance itself on the interbank market, and through its immediate delivery was well fitted 
to the purpose of eliminating the threat to the stability of the Swedish economy that the failure of 
Carnegie Bank would have entailed;71 (b) necessary, since it was taken in the form of a loan of a 
reversible character and with an interest rate of 150 basis points above the Riksbank’s repo rate to 
adequately reflect the lender’s risk and to limit the beneficiary’s reliance on the ELA to the minimum 
necessary; 72 and (c) proportional, since the aid was accompanied with a serious of behavioural 
commitments by the beneficiary and Sweden’s commitment to provide a restructuring or liquidation 
plan by a set date, thus limiting the time the rescue aid would be provided, all of which was designed to 
limit the risk of undue distortion of competition.73 In light of this, the Commission concluded that the 
aid was compatible with the common market pursuant to Article 87(3)(b) of the Treaty.74
PART II - THE THEORY ON THE LENDER OF LAST RESORT
(1) The Central Bank’s Role as a Lender of Last Resort and its Justifications 
A national central bank fulfils a variety of functions, including acting as a bank both to the 
government and to the other banks (public and private). Typically its tasks would also include issuing 
banknotes, keeping and investing the country’s official foreign exchange and gold reserves, controlling 
foreign exchange transactions, conducting monetary and credit policy and engaging in prudential 
supervision of the activities of credit institutions75, though this latter function can also be performed by 
another institution (such as the independent Financial Services Authority in the UK). However, it is its 
crisis management function, namely the provision of ELA to individual banks or the market as a whole 
which is particularly relevant for the present discussion. This is what is termed its “lender of last resort” 
(‘LOLR’) function. According to classical LOLR theory (as born in the 19th Century out of the works 
by Henry Thornton76 and Walter Bagehot77), the banks that are unable to finance themselves on the 
                                                
71 Ibid., paras.37-38
72 Ibid., paras.39-42
73 Ibid., paras.43-46
74 Ibid., para.47
75 See e.g. Mary Papaschinopoulou, The Legal Articulation of Central Bank Independence: An Interdisciplinary and 
Comparative Analysis, Schriftenreihe des Europa-Kollegs Hamburg zur Integrationsforschung, Band 34 (2002, Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft Baden-Baden/Ant. N. Sakkoulas Publishers Athens), p.53, n.64; see also national legislation outlining 
the functions of the Member States’ respective central banks, e.g. Art.3(2) of the Polish Act on the National Bank of Poland 
of 29 August 1997, Art.2 of the Act on the National Bank of Slovakia 1992, Art.2 of Act No. 6/1993 Coll. of 17 December 
1992 on the Czech National Bank; Art.11 of the Bank of Slovenia Act, Official Gazette of RS, No. 58/02; Art.2 of the 
National Bank of Romania Act (Law No. 312 / 28.06.2004)
76 Henry Thornton, An Enquiry into the Nature and Effects of the Paper Credit of Great Britan (1802, Hatchart, London)
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interbank market can turn to the central bank for a loan, to which a high interest rates is applied and 
which is secured by the bank’s good assets (collateral). Such a LOLR facility is unique to the banking 
sector and is justified by a number of factors present solely in connection with the specific nature of 
banking activity, which make the banking sector particularly vulnerable to systemic risk.
Banks are special
What makes banks particularly vulnerable to systemic failure is their unique balance sheet structure 
- banks tend to take short-term deposits (reflected on the liabilities side of their balance sheet) which is 
the main source of their liquidity, and make long-term loans (the traditional assets of banking activity). 
Thus, the bank’s liquidity is largely tied up in illiquid long-term loans. Given also the expectation of 
depositors to be able to withdraw any or all of their money at any given time, there is an inherent 
mismatch of maturities between the bank’s assets (long-term loans) and liabilities (short-term deposits 
to be made available at the depositors’ request). 
Such a balance sheet structure “creates an inherent potential instability in the banking system” 
whereby rumours about individual bank’s financial condition could spread and, if the distressed 
institution is large or prominent, the panic could spread to other banks”78. This contagion effect may 
result from the following factors79: (i) by their deposit contracts, banks offer liquidity that finances 
illiquid assets of uncertain value; (ii) virtually no secondary market for bank loans exists; and (iii) 
information asymmetries make it difficult for potential purchasers in this secondary market to evaluate 
customer-specific information that is pertinent to the value of the contract; moreover, (iv) banks are 
much more interconnected than firms in other industries. These factors combined can throw even 
solvent banks into insolvency. This is so because, on the assumption that only some of the depositors 
will want to withdraw their money at any one particular point in time, the banks hold only a fraction of 
the funds deposited in liquid assets. Hence, if depositors “run” with a substantial number of them 
wanting to withdraw their money at the same time, the bank would have to suspend payments or sell 
assets, often at lower “fire sale” prices80, as panic drives down the value of assets that are by nature not 
easily marketable81. Although such systemic failure is a rare occurrence, the potential effects of a 
                                                                                                                                                                       
77 Walter Bagehot, Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market (originally published in 1873 by Henry H.S. King 
& Co., London; revised edition with a foreword by Peter Bernstein, 1999, Wiley, New York)
78 Edward W. Kelley, “Are Banks Still Special?”, Remarks at the Seminar on Banking Soundness and Monetary Policy in a 
World of Global Capital Markets, sponsored by the International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC, 29 January 1997 
79 Charles A.E. Goodhart, Financial regulation: why, how, and where now? (1998, Routledge), p.11
80 George J. Benston, ‘Consumer Protection as Justification for Regulating Financial-Services Firms and Products’ (2000)
17:3 Journal of Financial Services Research 277-301, at p.280
81 Goodhart (1998), op cit n.79, pp.8-9
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“chain reaction that may have a self reinforcing effect”82 could be “debilitating for the economy as a 
whole”83. This is so because the illiquidity and indeed the insolvency of an individual bank may have 
implications for the financial system as a whole by threatening the liquidity of other banks through 
contagion risk, given the potential direct exposures to the failing bank via the interbank market or the 
payments system, or the withdrawal of lines of credit from the failing bank84 in today’s increasingly 
interlinked financial markets.85 Indeed, as was noted by Allen and Gale, panic could cause even 
normally viable commercial banks to become insolvent, due to their interconnected nature.86
Interbank market
The interbank market allows banks with surplus liquidity (i.e. banks that received more payments 
than anticipated on any given day) to lend to banks with liquidity shortage (i.e. those banks that 
received less payments than was anticipated on that day)87, usually by way of secured or unsecured 
short-term loans at a high rate of interest (several basis points above base rate, depending on the 
estimated risk exposure). Thus, the interbank market is an important tool in managing such temporary 
imbalances in liquidity supply and demand. Without it, banks would need to keep larger reserves of 
cash to insure themselves against unanticipated liquidity shortages (as a sort of buffer). Instead, with an 
interbank market able to meet short-term liquidity needs, these buffer resources could be more usefully 
employed by being invested or lent long-term. 
When the interbank markets are functioning normally, a temporarily illiquid bank can borrow from 
the other banks with liquidity surplus at a rate suitable for its credit ranking and thus reflecting the 
                                                
82 Howard Davies (1999), ‘Financial Regulation: Why Bother?’, Society of Business Economists lecture, January 1999, 
London, FSA , mimeo
83 Kelley (1997), op cit n.78
84 See e.g. Glenn Hoggarth and Farouk Soussa, “Crisis management, lender of last resort and the changing nature of the 
banking industry” in Brealey, Clark, Goodhart et al (eds.), Financial Stability and Central Banks – a global perspective
(2001, Routledge, London), pp.166-186 at p.166
85 The problem of a bank being “too big to fail” or, as it is more recently referred to, “too interlinked to fail” or “too 
connected to fail” forms a significant justification for politicians to bail it out. See e.g. the statement of Alan Blinder, the 
former vice chairman of the Federal Reserve, when he argued that “everyone knows that there are institutions that are so 
large and interlinked with others that it is out of the question to let them fail.” (Rob Blackwell, “’Too Big to Fail’ Deniers 
Have a Tough Audience,” American Banker, June 4, 2001). The rationale for the “too big to fail” doctrine has been 
presented by Goodhart and Huang, who argue that the threat to financial stability is often related to the size of the failed 
bank: Charles A.E. Goodhart and Haizhou Huang, “A Model of the Lender of Last Resort” (1999) IMF Working Paper 
99/39. For a contrasting view on the TBTF issue see Gary H. Stern and Ron J. Feldman, Too Big to Fail: The Hazards of 
Bank Bailouts (2004, Brookings Institution Press) where the two senior officers of the Federal Reserve argue that the 
government should not provide bailouts even to large banks.
86 Franklin Allen and Douglas M. Gale, “Optimal Financial Crises” (1998) 53 Journal of Finance 1245-1284; Franklin 
Allen and Douglas M. Gale, “Financial Contagion” (2000) 108 Journal of Political Economy 1-33
87 See e.g. G. Selgin, “In Defence of Bank Suspension” (1993) 7 Journal of Financial Services Research 347-64
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counterparty credit risk (the risk that the borrowing bank will not be able to repay the loan at the 
designated time, due to, for example, its insolvency). This means that a bank that is unable to obtain a 
loan at the interbank market is perceived to be an unsuitable borrower by the market: its credit rating is 
too low, it is unable to make high interest rate payments, it has no good collateral to secure the loan and 
the market may be anticipating its impending insolvency.88 However, under certain circumstances even 
solvent banks may be unable to borrow on the interbank market. This may be due to information 
asymmetries, whereby the interbank market is only able to access incomplete information about the 
institution, which raises doubts as to its solvency, when in fact the bank is sound.89 Moreover, the 
interbank market may become cautious in times of crisis90, with individual banks losing confidence in 
the market and each other. As such, banks could refuse to lend their surplus liquidity if they cannot be 
confident that they will themselves be able to borrow later to address their own liquidity shortage91. 
This was, for example, the case in September 2007 when the British Northern Rock experienced a bank 
run following a media announcement of its liquidity problems92 and in September 2008 after Lehman 
Brothers filed for bankruptcy in the United States, raising doubts with its creditors worldwide as to the 
possibility of recouping the money owed to them (in addition to the usual counterparty credit risk here, 
there was widespread legal uncertainty as to the exact level of exposure that foreign banks had with 
Lehman Brothers’ assets and the legal uncertainty associated with the priority of claims in insolvency 
proceedings). Thus, it has been argued 93 , central bank intervention may be justified under such 
circumstances to address interbank market failure, since illiquid banks, unable to borrow on the 
interbank market, can turn to the national central bank as a lender of last resort.
(2) Academic Debate on LOLR and current practice
We have seen that central bank intervention is justified where market failures impede an efficient 
allocation of surplus liquidity on the market and that, given the particular nature of banking activities 
                                                
88 See e.g. Charles Goodhart, “Myths about the Lender of Last Resort” in Charles Goodhart and Gerhard Illig (eds.), 
Financial Crises, Contagion and the Lender of Last Resort: A Reader (2002, OUP), p.231
89 See e.g. Freixas, Giannini, Hoggarth and Soussa, “Lender of Last Resort: a review of the literature” (1999) Financial 
Stability Review, November 1999, 151-167, at p.153; note also the efforts within the EU to remove the legal uncertainties 
related to the title to the collateral held by the bank seeking to borrow – the introduction of repurchasing agreements aims to 
manage the risk associated with collateral and the Settlement Finality Directive was introduced to reduce legal uncertainty 
as to title and to harmonise transaction laws across the EU.
90 M. Flannery, “Financial Crises, Payment System Problems and Discount Window Lending” (1996) 28 Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking 804-824
91 Freixas, Parigi and Rochet, “Systemic Risk, Interbank Relations and Liquidity Provision by the Central Bank” (1998) 
Mimeo, IDEI
92 The Chancellor’s “Statement on emergency liquidity assistance” to HM Treasury on 25 November 2009  
93 See e.g. Freixas, Giannini, Hoggarth and Soussa (1999), op cit n.89, at p.154
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and the unique balance-sheet structure of a bank, illiquidity can often lead to insolvency, which is 
undesirable due to the potential contagion effects that the failure of a bank can produce. Bagehot 
originally suggested that in a liquidity crisis, a central bank should lend freely to illiquid but solvent 
banks, at “a very high rate of interest” and against good collateral, with the object of “stay[ing] the 
alarm”.94 Moreover, he was of the opinion that such a policy should be made known to the market in 
advance and as soon as possible after the onset of the panic, so as to provide confidence and “stay the 
panic”.
Since the publication of Bagehot’s famous Lombard Street in 1873, the theory of the lender of last 
resort has received a lot of attention from academics and practitioners alike. Currently, the conditions 
for LOLR vary slightly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction95, but in general these include the following: (i) 
ELA support is only to be made available to illiquid but solvent institutions; (ii) against good collateral 
with sufficient ‘haircuts’ (or margins) applied to safeguard the central bank against counterparty credit 
risk; (iii) at a high or “penalty” rate; (iv) where the systemic stability of the financial system is 
threatened; and (v) where the decision is at the discretion of the central bank, to avoid any expectation 
to receiving ELA support so as to avoid moral hazard.96 These general conditions, though modelled on 
Bagehot’s original rules, go beyond the classical LOLR theory in adding additional requirements and 
going counter to the suggestions made by Thornton and Bagehot. These have been a matter of hot 
debate in academic literature, the main tenets of which will be briefly addressed in turn.
(i) The question of solvency
Emergency liquidity assistance should only be made available to illiquid but otherwise solvent 
banks. It has been argued that if an institution is clearly insolvent, it is up to the government to decide 
whether or not it considers it necessary to provide it with risk capital for rescue or to orderly liquidate it. 
The central bank’s role would be to advise the government on the systemic consequences that the 
failure of the institution would produce,97 but the central bank itself no longer has the mandate to act as 
a lender of last resort, since this facility can only be made available to illiquid but otherwise solvent 
institutions. This is a question of legitimacy, as once an institution is insolvent, the decision as to its 
                                                
94 Bagehot (1873), p.197
95 For a thorough comparative analysis, see Ross S. Delston and Andrew Campbell, “Emergency Liquidity Financing by 
Central Banks: Systemic Protection or Bank Bailout?”, IMF Legal Department and IMF Institute Seminar on Current 
Developments in Monetary and Financial Law, 7-17 May 2002 
96 See e.g. for the approach taken by the Bank of England, guidance by former Governor of the Bank of England, Sir 
Edward George, ‘The Pursuit of Financial Stability’ (1994) Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin at pages 60-66; see also an 
example of a legislative provision for ELA support: Art.33(2) of the Bulgarian Law on the Bulgarian National Bank
97 See e.g. Freixas, Giannini, Hoggarth and Soussa (1999), op cit n.89, at p.159
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rescue or liquidation entails considerations of public policy and will be based on other political and 
social criteria going beyond the question of systemic stability and thus it should up to the government 
to make the call.
However, in practice it is generally difficult to distinguish between illiquidity and insolvency in 
times of crisis. Goodhart even refers to the assertion that this is possible as the first myth about the 
lender of last resort.98 Indeed, according to Goodhart, whenever a central bank is approached by an 
individual commercial bank for ELA, the “CB must/should suspect that the failure of the bank to adjust 
its liquidity on the open market means that there is at least a whiff of suspicion of insolvency”99 since 
an individual bank will only go to the CB seeking ELA when it cannot meet its liquidity needs on the 
wholesale markets, which “almost by definition […] must be because it is running out of good security 
for collateralized loans and other (bank) lenders will not lend to it on an unsecured basis in the 
quantities required (at acceptable rates)”, which in turn must “almost by definition […] be because 
there is some question about its ultimate solvency.”100 However, as was already noted above, there may 
be instances where the interbank market fails due to information asymmetries and a solvent bank is not 
able to borrow. Moreover, as a study conducted by Berger et al revealed, the market is not always 
accurate in assessing the financial health of banks.101 Still, this means that the question as to the 
solvency of an individual financial institution which seeks LOLR support from the central bank is a 
difficult one. 
An example of this difficulty is presented by the mere definition of insolvency. In most legal 
jurisdictions, insolvency is defined by the inability of a firm to meet its liabilities as these fall due102
(legal definition), whereas the economic definition of insolvency entails an evaluation of the firm’s 
overall balance sheet, namely, a firm is deemed to be insolvent when the total value of its assets is less 
than the amount of its total liabilities. In the context of banks, the distinction between these two 
definitions is particularly acute. Given the particular balance sheet structure of the bank, with its short-
term liabilities (deposits) and long-term assets (loans) only a fraction of which is held in liquid form, 
the bank may be economically solvent (has more assets than liabilities), but is unable to meet its 
obligations as these fall due, since it cannot easily convert its long-term illiquid assets into cash. 
Moreover, when forced to do so, given that generally there is no good secondary market for bank loans, 
it has to sell them at an undervalue, leading to great losses and possibly ultimately resulting in 
                                                
98 Goodhart (2002), op cit n.88, at p.229
99 Ibid., p.232
100 Ibid., p.231
101 A. Berger, S. Davies and M. Flannery, “Comparing Market and Regulatory Assessments of Bank Performance: Who 
Knows What When?”, Federal Reserve Board Working Paper, March 1998
102 See e.g. Section 123 of the UK Insolvency Act 1986
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insolvency. Thus, the distinction between the bank’s illiquidity and its insolvency is a very fine line, 
which is not easy to draw, especially when only limited information is available to the central bank and 
the time-scale required for making a decision is very short.103 There is also some evidence that in many 
industrial countries, authorities have often advanced support even when confronted with a genuine 
insolvency problem.104
(ii) The question of good collateral with ‘haircuts’
A similar difficulty presents itself in the questions of “adequate” or “good” collateral. Bagehot 
suggested that LOLR support should only be extended to banks with good collateral and that 
institutions without good collateral should be allowed to fail (under the assumption that they are 
insolvent). As was noted above, banks seeking LOLR support are deemed to not be fit to borrow at the 
interbank market, due possibly to the fact that they do not have collateral deemed adequate by other 
bank lenders. In such a situation, in times of crisis, Bagehot suggested that the central bank should 
relax its quality standards on collateral and accept other types of collateral that it would not accept in 
normal times. Such a policy is justifiable on the assumption that the bank is solvent, in that it has 
illiquid assets for which there is no secondary market (which is why it cannot use them as security in 
the interbank market) and, after borrowing temporarily from the central bank against such assets, the 
bank will be able to use them as planned (long-term investment) upon their return to the bank when it 
discharges its obligations with the central bank. 
One conceptual difficulty with such a policy is that the availability of good collateral is a sign of the 
bank’s solvency, so extending the range of collateral deemed ‘acceptable’ could signal the bank’s 
impending insolvency (in that it has no assets that would be accepted as collateral by the central bank 
in normal times). Moreover, this could lead to the central bank incurring losses by giving ELA to banks 
who can only offer lower quality collateral as security. Asset prices can fluctuate substantially during 
the period for which ELA is granted, and the market value of the collateral could in the meantime 
decrease. Moreover, in times of crisis there is a substantial risk that the bank becomes insolvent after 
ELA has been extended and before it is able to repay the central bank. In such instances, the value of 
the collateral may depreciate substantially, given especially the personalised nature of the bank’s assets 
                                                
103 Charles A.E. Goodhart, The Central Bank and the Financial System (1995, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA); Rosa Maria 
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– loans extended by a commercial bank are usually tailored to the individual customers and their value 
is tied to the information that the bank has about its customers. When a bank leaves the market, this 
information is lost and the value of its assets depreciates.
In light of this, it is questionable whether the policy of relaxing the standards of acceptable 
collateral is a sound practice, since it is likely to expose the central bank to excessive risks if the 
collateral turns out to be inadequate if the borrowing bank fails or if the collateral itself turns out to be 
‘toxic’ (e.g. collateral debt obligations widely traded until the market failure of 2007, though of course 
Bagehot could never have had such innovative financial instruments in mind when he called for the 
relaxation of quality standards on collateral to be deemed acceptable by the central bank).105 For 
example, Laurens suggests that acceptable collateral should be debt instruments issued or guaranteed 
by financially sound entities, that it should not be issued by the counterparty to the central bank or 
where the creditworthiness of the issuer is dependent on that of the counterparty, and moreover, that it 
should not fall due for repayment before the maturity date of the monetary operation they 
collateralise.106 Such precautions should ensure that the collateral is sound even if the counterparty 
bank goes insolvent, but at the same time the types of collateral that fall within this category is severely 
restricted, so it becomes unlikely that quality of acceptable collateral becomes too relaxed.
Moreover, the collateral used to secure the ELA should also be accompanied by ‘haircuts’ or 
margins to insulate the central bank from counterparty credit and collateral valuation risk. These 
haircuts are to be determined on a case-by-case basis, depending on, inter alia, the counterparty’s credit 
ranking, the quality of the collateral offered and the amount of ELA requested. 
(iii) The question of penalty rates
According to both Thornton and Bagehot, LOLR support should only be extended against a very 
high interest rate. Some commentators take this to mean that LOLR should always be at a ‘penalty’ rate, 
meaning at a rate higher than that available on the market.107 However, more recently it has been 
suggested that though the rate should indeed be higher than in the market prior to the panic, it need not 
                                                
105 On the issue of the consequences of financial innovation, see e.g. Gai et al, “Financial innovation, macroeconomic 
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necessarily be above the contemporaneous market rate.108 Indeed, a number of commentators have 
pointed out the central bank’s unique position to change the priority of claims on the banks’ assets in 
crisis periods, which enables them to lend at a rate lower than demanded on the interbank market, 
which imposes high penalty rates on the banks’ risky assets.109 This means that if the banks cannot 
afford to borrow on the interbank market (due to for example the uncertainties associated with the 
bank’s assets, which drives their value down and the interest rate for interbank loans up), they should 
be able to obtain a cheaper loan from the central bank so as not to compromise their stability. The 
literature reflects numerous examples where emergency lending to individual solvent institutions has 
been made without applying a premium over the current notional market rate110. Such a divergence 
from Bagehot rules has been justified for several reasons. Firstly, lending at a high/penalty interest rate 
may aggravate the bank’s crisis situation111, eventually leading to the undesirable result – the bank’s 
insolvency. Secondly, lending at a penalty rate may send a signal to the market that precipitates an 
untimely run on the bank, unless ELA is provided covertly.112 Finally, it may give the managers 
incentives to pursue a higher risk/reward strategy to get themselves out of trouble (the so-called 
‘gamble for resurrection’).113
However, the original Bagehot rule was concerned with the repercussions that lending at (or below) 
the market rate may have. First of all, ELA by the central bank is meant to be a measure of truly last 
resort. If, however, the interest rate for ELA is set at the same level as that available on the interbank 
market, then the distinction between the two types of borrowing becomes less defined. Secondly, a 
moral hazard risk arises, in that the banks are no longer incentivised to act more prudently, since even 
if they cannot obtain funding on the interbank market, they can still go to the central bank that would 
lend at the same interest rate as the market. Finally, even insolvent banks, by posing as illiquid ones, 
could obtain funding this way, since it is difficult to distinguish between the two and since the central
bank is no better informed than the market (unless it also performs a supervisory function and has 
recently performed a review of that particular bank’s financial position). 114 Indeed, according to 
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Bagehot, higher than interbank market rates for LOLR support are needed to prevent banks from 
relying on central bank liquidity assistance unless this is absolutely necessary, since such rates “will 
operate as a heavy find on unreasonable timidity, and will prevent the greatest number of applications 
by persons who do not require it” so that “no one may borrow out of idle precaution without paying 
well for it” and “then the banking reserve may be protected as far as possible”.115
(iv) The question of systemic stability
The central bank should only intervene when the systemic stability of the entire financial system 
would be threatened by the failure of the institution(s) in question. However, the definitions of 
‘systemic stability’, ‘systemic risk’ or indeed ‘financial stability’ are still the subject of much debate in 
academic literature. As was remarked by Alan Greenspan, “it would be useful to central banks to be 
able to measure systemic risk accurately, but its very definition is still somewhat unsettled. It is 
generally agreed that systemic risk represents a propensity for some sort of significant financial system 
disruption.”116 This is a widely accepted view, however, it offers little guidance to central banks when 
faced with a potentially “significant financial system disruption”, in the absence of a more exact 
definition. 
Schinasi attempted to define ‘financial stability’ as "the joint stability of the key financial 
institutions operating within financial markets and the stability of those markets” and more generally 
“the absence of the kind of volatility that could have severe real economic consequences"117. Moreover, 
the financial system is perceived to be as ‘stable’ when there is confidence118 and when it “is in such 
condition that it can comfortably if not smoothly absorb financial and real economic surprises and 
shocks [systemic risks]".119
One possible definition of ‘systemic risk’ was offered by the Group of Ten, who considered it to be 
“the risk that an event will trigger a loss of economic value or confidence in (…) a substantial portion 
of the financial system that is serious enough to quite probably have significant adverse effects on the 
                                                
115 Bagehot (1873), p.197
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real economy”120. The effect of such a systemic risk would cause disruptions in credit flows, collapses 
in asset prices and disruptions of the payment system, leading to and causing the failure of illiquid but 
solvent (financial and non-financial) firms. 121
However, in most cases ‘systemic stability’ seems to be defined by reference to, or “as an absence 
of instability”122, which is more easily observed (and hence can be more exactly defined). According to 
Ferguson, instability is usually characterised by the sharp divergence of an important set of financial 
asset prices from the fundamentals, significant distortions in market functioning and the availability of 
credit, resulting in significant deviations in aggregate spending from the economy’s ability to 
produce.123 Thus, ‘instability’ becomes evident once a certain set of symptoms can observed on the 
markets. However, such a definition implies that the assessment of stability or instability is necessarily 
ex post, whereas the central bank needs to be able to take a decision ex ante, when there is a “threat to 
systemic stability” so as to be able to prevent the markets from becoming unstable. Thus, the central 
bank needs some kind of guidance as to when a crisis situation exhibits a “threat to systemic stability”. 
Some commentators suggest that where more than 20% of the deposits in a banking system are affected 
the crisis should be considered systemic. 124 However, as pointed out by Schinasi, given the 
“multifaceted nature of financial stability” and the various factors at play, developments leading up to 
financial instability are impossible to summarise in a single quantitative indicator and are thus 
inherently difficult to forecast.125 This means that when approached by a bank in distress, the central 
bank needs to be able to exercise discretion and to reach a decision with the (limited) information 
available to it.
(v) The question of discretion of the central bank
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According to LOLR theory, the central bank in exercising its LOLR function needs to be able to 
exercise discretion when considering whether or not to grant ELA to a bank in distress. This question 
of discretion seems to have developed in parallel with the evolution of the notion of central bank 
independence, presumed in part already by Bagehot, but recognised explicitly only fairly recently, 
following a century-long debate between economists, policy-makers and lawyers. Central bank 
independence is nowadays a commonly accepted principle of financial regulation and central bank 
governance, especially in the European Union.
Legal independence of national central banks in the EU
The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 recognised monetary stability as a substantial task of the 
Community126 (now European Union127) and the primary objective of the European System of Central 
Banks (‘ESCB’).128 For the creation of a common market and single monetary union, Maastricht Treaty 
required the Member States to take substantive steps so as to ensure independence of their national 
central banks.129 At the time of its drafting, only two Member States guaranteed legal independence of 
their national central banks: Spain and Germany.130 In the 1990’s, however, all of the Member States 
had adopted new, or amended their existing, laws so as to conform with their obligations under the 
Treaties.131 The new Member States that acceded after the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty 
have also introduced new laws to guarantee independence of their respective central banks.132
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De jure and de facto independence
Thus, at least in the European Union, central bank independence is legally guaranteed. However, 
there is a distinction between de jure and de facto independence, or the actual ability of the bank to act 
independently.133 As has been pointed out by Forder, “a central bank may be independent by statute, 
and it is nevertheless accepted – on all sides – that the government will have its wishes 
implemented”.134 It is therefore of paramount importance that central banks are in practice able fulfil 
their functions and exercise their discretion independently of their respective governments. Their 
ability to do so may depend on a range of different factors, including the structure and composition of 
their governance boards, the legal and political culture of the State and the range of legal mechanisms 
available to review the actions of the government and/or directors and governors of the central bank.135
A further issue to consider here is the question of de facto financial independence of the central bank. 
For example, it was found that in practice, many central banks are unlikely to be in a position to 
independently take on the credit risk associated with ELA loans in times of crisis when it is possible 
that the value of the collateral used to secure the loan falls below the value of the loan.136 Therefore the 
central banks would usually require a government guarantee to cover this exposure to risks associated 
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with collateral value and counterparty creditworthiness. 137 Such a government guarantee would, 
however, go counter to one of the Commission’s conditions for a finding that a central bank’s support 
measure to a particular institution falls outside the scope of state aid rules.138
(3) LOLR Theory as reflected in EU State Aid Policy on NCB Interventions
EC state aid rules on emergency liquidity assistance by central banks are modelled, whether 
explicitly or implicitly, on the main tenets of LOLR theory. This becomes apparent not only through 
the general language and principles adopted in the Commission’s Communications giving guidance to 
the Member States in modelling their support packages to the banking sector (1), but also when 
considering the express conditions used by the Commission to determine whether or not ELA falls 
outside the scope of application of state aid rules (2). 
LOLR Theory is trickling down into Commission’s state aid policy language
Both the ‘Banking Communication’ and the ‘Recapitalisation Communication’ 139 make the 
distinction between exogenously and endogenously-distressed banks. The former are defined as 
“fundamentally sound” whose “viability problems are inherently exogenous and have to do with the 
present extreme situation in the financial market rather than with inefficiency or excessive risk-taking”, 
whereas the latter are characterised as being “likely to be particularly affected by losses stemming for 
instance from inefficiencies, poor asset-liability management or risky strategies.140 Such a distinction is 
reminiscent of the formal illiquid/insolvent distinction, which lies at the heart of LOLR theory, with 
illiquid banks suffering from exogenous shocks in the market and insolvent banks being endogenously 
affected and thus not meriting LOLR support.
Conditions for application of state aid rules are modelled on LOLR Theory
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The conditions of ‘Banking Communication’ according to which CB liquidity support may be 
found to fall outside the scope of state aid rules mirrors Bagehot rules and the more recent LOLR 
theory, in providing that (1) the borrowing bank is solvent, (2) the liquidity is provided in exchange for 
good collateral with adequate ‘haircuts’ and (3) against a penalty interest rate, and that (4) the decision 
to support the bank is taken by the central bank independently of the government.141 Such a policy is 
justified by having regard to the particular role of a national central bank as a lender of last resort, 
namely the provision of emergency liquidity assistance to banks that are otherwise unable to finance 
themselves on the interbank lending market. In other words, according to the Commission, as long as 
the central bank is acting in its LOLR capacity, state aid rules do not apply, as such intervention on 
behalf of the central bank has to do with the monetary policy and the systemic stability of the financial 
market of the State concerned. However, this also means that where the central bank steps outside of its 
LOLR function, its support has to be reviewed as to its conformity with state aid rules of the Union. It 
is therefore imperative to be able to determine when the central bank is acting in its LOLR capacity, 
since this would in turn determine whether or not EU rules on state aid are to be applied and whether a 
notification to the Commission, pursuant to Art.108(3) TFEU (ex Art.88(3) EC) is necessary. If it is
found that the central bank oversteps its LOLR function in providing liquidity support, such a measure 
may still be considered compatible with the common market if it satisfies the conditions of the R&R 
Guidelines.142 However, the determination of whether or not liquidity support is advanced in the course 
of the NCB’s function as a LOLR is not straightforward and requires a further in-depth analysis of the 
central bank’s LOLR role and the theory behind it.
Conclusion on LOLR Theory
In this Part it was submitted that EU rules on state aid in relation to the banking sector, and more 
specifically to ELA provided by the NCBs, is modelled on, or informed by, the theory on the lender of 
last resort. The conditions applied by the Commission in order to determine whether or not such 
assistance falls within the scope of application of rules on state aid are inspired by the original Bagehot 
rules and subsequent academic debate on LOLR theory. However, it was also shown that LOLR 
literature is itself not unanimous on the five main principles for central bank intervention as a lender of 
last resort. This adds to the complexity in determining whether or not a particular intervention by the 
central bank is an LOLR support measure and thus whether or not state aid rules should be applied.
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PART III – STATE AID RULES AND THEIR APPLICATION TO NCB INTERVENTIONS
EU State aid control is necessary to maintain a level playing field for all undertakings active in 
the Single European Market, no matter in which Member State they are established143, but is the current 
State aid control well adopted to deal with all the sectors of a Member State’s economy, or in other 
words, does it apply equally to all, including the banking, sectors, or is a deviation from the regime 
justified in particular circumstances?
In early case-law an attempt was made to qualify the banking sector as ‘special’ in light of its 
importance to the economy and the special characteristics it exhibits by comparison with the other 
sectors, as was discussed above.144 In an attempt to exempt the banking sector from the state aid rules, 
the Member States claimed that banks were performing a service of general economic interest. 
However, such an argument was quickly dismissed by the ECJ, which in Züchner held that since the 
banks were not per se “entrusted with services of general economic interest”, they were not as such 
exempt from competition rules.145 Nevertheless, the Commission later admitted in Banesto that even 
though state aid rules must apply to the banking sector, the special characteristics present therein may 
justify financial intervention by the State, particularly when it is considered necessary to avoid a 
systemic crisis, to restore public confidence in the stability of the banking sector or to protect the 
proper functioning of the payment system.146 Following the case, the Commission issued guidelines 
that it would henceforth use in its assessment of state aid in the banking sector. 147 The group of experts 
that in 1995 was charged by the Commission with the task of reflecting upon the applicability of state 
aid rules to banks148 came to the conclusion that the normal sate aid rules could – and even should – be 
applied to the banking sector, taking into consideration the ‘special characteristics’ and the ‘sensitivity’ 
of this sector.149 Thus, the application of state aid rules to the banking sector should ensure that banks 
do not act in an imprudent manner, which could lead to distortions of competition in the market, merely 
because they are publicly owned and/or considered ‘too big to fail’.150 However, are the state aid rules 
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really well adapted to the banking sector, and in particular, to cases of NCB interventions? The rules on 
state aid and the criteria for their application to NCB support will now be analysed in more detail.
Article 107(1) TFEU provides: “Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by a 
Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort 
competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it 
affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the common market.” The aim of this 
Article, according to EU case law, is to prevent trade between Member States from being affected by 
benefits granted by public authorities which in various forms, distort or threaten to distort competition 
by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain products.151 Therefore, Article 107(1) 
TFEU has to be interpreted so as to further the purpose of the provision, also engrained in Article 
3(1)(g) EC152 and is therefore to be interpreted broadly.153 Indeed, it has been consistently held that the 
concept of an ‘aid’ is wide, going beyond a subsidy, and comprises any form of intervention or 
assistance which has the same or similar effects to a subsidy.154 Aid is therefore to be defined in 
relation to its effects155 and not by reference to their causes or their aims. In other words, there is no 
‘rule of reason’ or concept of ‘objective justification’ in the interpretation of Article 87(1).156 This 
means that the purpose of ELA, namely the temporary provision of liquidity to individual banks or the 
market as a whole to prevent a systemic crisis from spreading through the banking sector to the real 
economy, is of no relevance in the determination of whether or not ELA constitutes state aid. It can, 
however, be invoked at the justification stage under Article 107(3) TFEU .
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It has been well acknowledged in the case law of the Courts of the European Union that State aid 
‘is a legal concept which must be interpreted on the basis of objective factors.’157 The role of EU 
Courts is to carry out a comprehensive review as to whether a measure constitutes State aid within the 
meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU , “having regard both to the specific features of the case before them 
and to the technical or complex nature of the Commission’s assessment” 158. For this reason, the 
Commission deemed to have no discretion in the application of Article 107(1) TFEU 159 - in stark 
contrast to the application of Article 107(3) TFEU .160
Examples of State aid include, inter alia, capital investments and injections,161 loans at a rate of 
interest below normal commercial rates162, or on preferential interest terms (so-called ‘soft loans’)163 or 
without sufficient security,164 or interest free loans,165 interest rate subsidies166. Moreover, a mere loan 
announcement was found by the Commission to constitute State aid, even though the loan was never 
actually implemented.167 Therefore, at first glance, it seems that ELA would fall under the definition of 
State aid. However, first impressions can be deceptive and in order to be able to answer the question of 
whether or not ELA falls within the scope of application of Article 107(1) TFEU , a more in-depth 
analysis of the criteria for a finding of State aid is necessary. According to the EU Courts’ 
interpretation of Article 87(1), in order for this Article to apply, the measure must satisfy the following 
cumulative168 criteria: (a) there must be aid in the sense of a benefit or advantage;169 (b) which is 
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granted by the State170 and through State resources;171 (c) which favours certain undertakings or the 
production of certain goods (‘selectivity’);172 and (d) which is liable to distort competition and affect 
trade between Member States.173 The requirement of selectivity, is met in the type of cases examined 
here, since emergency liquidity assistance to individual undertakings is by definition selective. The 
other three criteria will be examined in more detail below, starting with the last, which appears more 
straightforward in the context of NCB interventions in the banking sector. A more detailed analysis of 
the first two criteria, and selected problems with their application to the banking sector, follows below.
DISTORTION OF COMPETITION AND EFFECT ON TRADE
A measure falls within the ambit of Article 107(1) TFEU only if it distorts or threatens to distort 
competition and adversely affects trade between Member States. Although these are two separate 
criteria, the practice of the Court of Justice has been to join the two together in its assessment, since 
competition is distorted and trade between Member States is adversely affected where a State aid 
strengthens the position of an undertaking in relation to its competitors in the intra-Community trade.174
More recently, the CFI considered the two requirements “as a general rule inextricably linked.”175
In its assessment of these criteria, the Commission is not obligated to make separate findings 
concerning the relevant markets and the position the beneficiary undertaking enjoys within this market 
and to what degree the granting of the preferential treatment would or might distort competition on the 
affected markets.176 Nor is it obligated to prove the actual effects that a measure will produce on trade 
between Member States or that there will in fact be an adverse effect on competition.177  It “merely 
needs to establish that the aid in question is of such a kind as to affect trade between Member States 
                                                
170 In other words, it is imputable to the State: see e.g. Case T-358/94 Air France v Commission [1996] ECR II-2109, 
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and threatens to distort competition.”178 According to Heidenhain, Courts of the Union “in effect infer 
from the preferential treatment of an undertaking that its competitiveness will be strengthened, and 
again from there that an adverse effect on intra-Community trade will result.” 179 The Courts have 
established certain principles, to which Heidenhain refers to as “irrefutable presumptions” or “per se 
rules” 180 , according to which it will be presumed that intra-Community trade is impacted and 
competition is at least at the risk of being distorted whenever an aid granted by a Member State to an 
undertaking, which is active in a market characterised by intense competition, strengthens the position 
of this undertaking in relation to its competitors in the Common market.181
Thus, the conditions are presumed to be met when the beneficiary undertaking is carrying on a 
cross-border activity, or is active in a sector which is characterised by a substantial level of trade 
between Member States182 by, for example, containing a large number of multinational undertakings,183
and which is characterised by intense competition, especially if it has been liberalised at the EU-wide 
level, which is all true of the financial services sector.184 Thus, in relation to aid granted in the banking 
sector, especially to a multinational institution, which is quite likely in the case of banks operating in 
the EU, it can usually be presumed that the aid will distort or will at least risk distorting competition185
and is likely to have an effect on intra-Community trade. 
GRANTED BY THE STATE OR THROUGH STATE RESOURCES
There was much debate about the interpretation of this strand of Article 107(1) TFEU , with 
proponents of the narrow view claiming that financing through public resources is a constitutive 
element of the definition of State aid186 and that a certain burden on the public finances in the form 
either of expenditure or of reduced revenue was necessary for a finding of State aid.187 Proponents of 
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the wider view considered that any measure which confers economic advantages on specific 
undertakings, and which is the result of conduct attributable to the State, should constitute State aid 
regardless of whether it involves any actual financial burden for the State. 188 [The primary 
consideration is therefore the effect of the aid, rather than the financial burden on the institution which 
grants the aid.”189] The position was finally clarified by the Court of Justice in PreussenElektra, where 
it held that: “[t]he distinction made in that provision between aid granted “by a Member State” and aid 
granted “through State resources” does not signify that all advantages granted by a State, whether 
financed through State resources or not, constitute aid but is intended merely to bring within that 
definition both advantages which are granted directly by the State and those granted by a public or 
private body designated or established by the State.”190 Thus, for an advantage to be categorised as aid, 
it must be (i) granted directly or indirectly through State resources, and (ii) be imputable to the State191
with these conditions being cumulative, rather than alternative.192
DEFINITION OF ‘STATE’
According to long-standing case law, the concept of a ‘State’ within Article 107(1) TFEU is not 
limited to the federal or central authorities of a Member State, but includes regional and local bodies, 
whatever their status.193 Therefore, State aid may emanate from any body within the public sector.194 It 
seems, therefore, at first glance, that a national central bank would fall within this definition of the 
“State”. However, there is no ‘one size fits all’ approach when it comes to central banks, as each of 
them is embedded in the legal, economic, political and social structure of a given State. Indeed, a 2009 
BIS Report on the Issues in the Governance of Central Banks found that most central banks exist 
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predominantly within their own country’s legal framework, which differs in its form and type from the 
legal framework of another country, which in turn affects arrangements for central banks.195 It was 
stated that whereas a number of recently created NCBs are part of the state and owned by it, some older 
central banks were originally created as privately owned institutions and continue to have features 
related to that status.196 Out of 47 countries considered in the report, 77% of central banks were fully 
owned by state or the public sector, 11% were majority or half owned by state or the public sector and 
4% were majority owned by private sector (interestingly, 9% were classified as “other”).197
In the European Union, though the majority of NCBs are State-owned, there are still some 
central banks that are at least partially private-owned, with most central banks exhibiting features of a 
hybrid institutional nature not like any public or private company or public authority.198 For example, 
the Belgian central bank is a limited company (société anonyme), 50% of share capital of which is 
owned by the State.199 The Greek law provides that the share capital of the Bank of Greece, similarly a 
société anonyme,200  cannot be held by the State or public enterprises to the amount exceeding 35%201. 
The Oesterreichische Nationalbank is also a stock corporation whose shares were until 2006 split 50/50 
between the public and the private sectors. 202  In 2006, 20% more shares were brought within the 
government’s control, 203 until the Bank was fully nationalised in 2010.204 These examples show that, 
despite the common sense logic which would seem to dictate that a national central bank forms part of 
the State and disposes of State resources, by, inter alia, holding the State’s reserves and being able to 
print the State’s money, this may not be the necessary conclusion of the Commission applying EU state 
aid rules and its own guidelines. Therefore, for the sake of argument, a more examination must take 
place on a case-by-case basis to determine whether a particular NCB can be assimilated to a Member 
State or whether its resources can be classified as “State resources”.
DEFINITION OF ‘STATE RESOURCES’
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The notion of ‘State resources’ covers all public funds, whatever their source and whatever their 
destination,205 including the funds and assets of central, regional or local government.206 Moreover, the 
broad notion of ‘State resources’ includes not only the resources of the Member State and of the State’s 
public authorities, but also the resources of public undertakings. The difference in the analysis lies in 
the fact that whilst aid granted directly by a public authority is considered directly attributable to the 
State, such a measure, if adopted by a public undertaking, can only be considered ‘state aid’ if it is also 
found to be imputable to the State. Moreover, under certain circumstances, funds of a private 
undertaking may be deemed to be ‘State resources’ if a sufficiently strong element of State control is 
present and thus aid need not necessarily need to be financed directly by the State to be classified as 
‘State aid’.207 A national central bank can potentially fall into one of these three categories: (1) public 
authority, (2) public undertaking, and (3) private undertaking under State control.
(1) NCB as a public authority
The notion of a ‘public authority’ includes “the State and regional, local and all other territorial 
authorities”208. Seventeen Member States have granted their NCBs the status of a ‘public authority’, 
‘public body’ or ‘public institution’ with exclusive note-issuing powers’ 209 or conferred upon it 
administrative powers of a public authority210. With these NCBs it could usually be presumed that their 
resources constitute ‘state resources’ for the purposes of Art.107(1) TFEU , since they also tend to be 
wholly State-owned and, according to the Commission in its Roskilde Bank rescue aid decision211, 
where the State is the sole shareholder of an NCB and this NCB is to be regarded as a public authority, 
the imputability to the State and the use of State resources need not be shown separately.
(2) NCB as a public undertaking
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A ‘public undertaking’ is defined as “any undertaking over which the public authorities may 
exercise directly or indirectly a dominant influence by virtue of their ownership of it, their financial 
participation therein, or the rules which govern it.”212 According to the Transparency Directive, such a 
dominant influence is to be “presumed when these [public] authorities, directly or indirectly in relation 
to an undertaking: (i) hold the major part of the undertaking’s subscribed capital; or (ii) control the 
majority of the votes attaching to shares issued by the undertakings; or (iii) can appoint more than half 
of the members of the undertaking's administrative, managerial or supervisory body.”213
There are 8 NCBs that are qualified as a ‘public limited company’ 214 in the legislation 
establishing and/or governing them. Applying the indicators set out in Art.2(b) of the Transparency 
Directive to determine whether or not the State exercises a “dominant influence” over these NCBs, the 
following picture emerges. 
(i) Capital ownership
Out of these 8 NCBs only the central banks of Belgium, Greece and Italy are not fully state-
owned (during the financial crisis, the central bank of Austria was also only partly owned by the State, 
which held 70% of the shares, until the Nationalbank was fully nationalised in May 2010). Thus, a 
dominant influence on behalf of the State may already be presumed in relation to the NCBs of Austria, 
Cyprus, Hungary, Ireland and The Netherlands.
(ii) Control of the majority of votes attached to the shares
In none of these three remaining NCBs does the respective State control the majority of shares. 
Whereas in Belgium, the State owns a 50% stake in the central bank215, in Greece the State or public 
enterprises are prohibited by law from holding more than 35% of the central bank’s capital216. The 
shares in the Bank of Italy are held by private corporations (mainly Italian banks and financial 
institutions).217 The Belgian Organic Act does not include any provision about how votes should be 
allocated to the shares and thus, it may be assumed, that such allocations are equal. Therefore, the State 
with its 50% may not control the majority of the votes. Article 1 of the Statute on the National Bank of 
Greece states that one vote is attached to every 25 shares owned. No provision is made for a 
differentiated allocation of votes to shares and it must therefore be assumed that it is equal and that 
therefore the State cannot control the majority of votes. In the case of Banca d’Italia, the majority of its 
shareholders are banks and insurance companies and apart from the Italian National Social Security 
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Institute’s holding of 15,000 shares with 34 out of 539 votes, no direct or indirect links to the Italian 
government or the public sector is evident. A detailed inquiry into the shareholding structure of each of 
the shareholders of the Banca d’Italia to determine the exact direct or indirect influence that the State or 
the public sector may have on the votes at the shareholders’ meetings is beyond the scope of the present 
paper, but in the absence of any obvious evidence to the contrary, for present purposes it may be 
assumed that the State does not control the majority of the votes.218
(iii) Control of the majority of the members of the undertaking’s administrative, managerial 
or supervisory body
Out of these 8 NCBs that carry the status of a public limited company, the State appoints the 
majority of the governing (administrative, managerial or supervisory) bodies in all but Greece, Italy 
and The Netherlands, though dominant influence in the latter may already be presumed by virtue of the 
State’s outright ownership.219
Based on this simple (and not fully-developed) analysis, only the banks of Greece and Italy 
seem at first sight to not qualify as “public undertakings” within the meaning of Article 2(b) of the 
Transparency Directive. The resources of the other 6 may be imputable to their respective Member 
States.
However, though a dominant influence by the State or the public authorities may be presumed 
in the case of these NCBs by virtue of their shareholding and corporate governance structures, 
according to EU case law, the grant of ELA by these NCBs should not necessarily be imputed to the 
State. The ECJ stated in Stardust Marine that “[e]ven if the State is in a position to control a public 
undertaking and to exercise a dominant influence over its operations, actual exercise of that control in 
particular case cannot be automatically presumed. A public undertaking may act with more or less 
independence, according to the degree of autonomy left to it by the State. […] Therefore, the mere fact 
that a public undertaking is under State control is not sufficient for measures taken by that undertaking, 
such as the financial support measures […], to be imputed to the State. It is also necessary to examine 
whether the public authorities must be regarded as having been involved, in one way or another, in the 
adoption of those measures.”220 This means that despite the presumption of a dominant influence, the 
decisions of these central banks in the field of monetary policy cannot be imputed to the State, if the 
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central bank in question adopted the measure independently, without instructions or influence by the 
State. 
This is so because all the NCBs of the Members States of the EU must, by virtue of their 
membership in the European System of Central Banks (‘ESCB’), be independent of the government in 
relation to monetary policy. Indeed, the legislative instruments that govern all these 6 NCBs, in relation 
to which dominant influence may be presumed, include a provision guaranteeing legal independence of 
the central bank in question, often expressed in addition/or as “freedom from instructions” from the 
government or public authorities. However, despite this general principle of independence in the field 
of monetary policy, the State does sometimes get involved in the central bank’s conduct of its LOLR 
function (which is usually considered as one of the tools available to the central bank for the 
implementation of its monetary policy, since it enables it to control the money supply and liquidity in 
the market). For example, state involvement was one of the deciding factors for a finding of state aid in 
Roskilde Bank,221 where part of the ELA facility was underwritten by a state guarantee, and in Northern 
Rock222, where the second ELA package was provided at the request of the Treasury. It is conceivable 
that the central banks in question in these cases would not have provided these ELA facilities had the 
State not intervened with a request and/or a guarantee. 
Considering the six NCBs in question here, it is notable that the Organic Act of the National 
Bank of Belgium dated 22 February 1998 contains, in Article 22, a provision which gives the Minister 
of Finance the right to supervise the Bank and oppose any measure contrary to the law or the interests 
of the State, except in relation to ESCB tasks (formulation and implementation of monetary policy 
being one of them). Potentially, therefore, the Minister could intervene if he considered LOLR support 
to a particular bank to be contrary to the State’s interests (e.g. if the State is pursuing a tough anti-bail-
out policy in the interests of preserving the market from moral hazard). Whether this is likely, or indeed 
ever happens, is a matter for discussion that is beyond the scope of this paper and will depend on the 
individual circumstances of each case.
(3) NCB as a private undertaking under State control
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Resources of entities other than public authorities or public undertakings, such as a State 
bank223, in other words, the resources of private undertakings, may also be considered to be ‘State 
resources’ if their allocation can be decisively influenced by public authorities. For example, in Van 
der Kooy, the ECJ attributed the allocation of Gasunie’s resources to the State only to the extent it was 
subject to State control, which was found since, inter alia, the State directly/indirectly held 50% of its 
shares the other 50% being privately owned, and appointed half of the members of its supervisory 
board.224 In holding that this constituted State aid, the ECJ took account of the fact that the Minister for 
Economic Affairs was empowered to approve the tariff, with the result that he could block any tariff 
which did not suit him. Accordingly, the company did not in fact enjoy full autonomy in the fixing of 
tariffs but acted under the control of the public authorities and took their requirements into account.225
In this regard, it is likely that NCBs are not in fact unaware of the government’s position as regards the 
exercise of their LOLR function and take this into consideration when making a decision. In fact, 
certain NCBs are not empowered to grant ELA to an amount  
When assessing the nature of the resources that these NCBs may use when performing their 
LOLR functions, several factors must be considered. These may include: (a) the way in which the 
undertaking was established;226 (b) the legal status of the undertaking (subject to public law or ordinary 
company law); 227 (c) the integration of the undertaking into the structures of the public 
administration;228 (d) the degree of supervision and management of the body by the public authorities, 
including of the extent of the shareholding (if any) of the State, the extent to which the governing board 
of the undertaking is appointed by the State,229 and any control over the budget of the undertaking;230 (e) 
the nature of the undertaking’s activities and the exercise of those activities on the market in normal 
conditions of competition with private operators,231 and the extent to which the undertaking performs 
regulatory functions;232 (f) the extent to which the contested decision was subject to the approval of, or 
                                                
223 Case 57/86 Greece v Commission [1988] ECR 2855; Commission decision of 8.9.1999, OJ 2000 L 206/6, para.37; 
Commission decision of 3.5.2000, OJ L 272/29, para.20; Commission decision of 21.4.1999, OJ 2001 L 30/45 at 47
224 Cases 67, 8 and 70/85 Van der Kooy v Commission [1988] ECR 219, para.36; See also Case C-305/89 Italy v 
Commission (‘Alfa Romeo’) [1991] ECR I-1603, paras.14-16; Case C-482/99 France v Commission (‘Stardust Marine’) 
[2002] ECR I-4397, para.56
225 Cases 67, 8 and 70/85 Van der Kooy [1988] ECR 219, para.36
226 See e.g. Decision 2006/513/EC Berlin-Brandenburg DTT [2006] OJ L200/14, para.53
227 Case C-482/99 Stardust Marine [2002] ECR I-4397, para.56
228 Ibid.
229 Cases 67, 8 and 70/85 Van der Kooy [1988] ECR 219, para.36 where the Court found that the undertaking Gasunie acted 
under the control of the public authorities since, inter alia, the State directly/indirectly held 50% of its shares and appointed 
half of the members of its supervisory board. See also Case C-305/89 Italy v Commission (‘Alfa Romeo’) [1991] ECR I-
1603, paras.14-16; Case C-482/99 Stardust Marine [2002] ECR I-4397, para.56
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requirements imposed by, the public authorities;233 (g) the way in which the measure is presented by 
the public authorities.234
Moreover, according to the judgment in Stardust Marine, resources can be ‘State resources’ 
even if they do not come from the State budget, provided that the State has control over them. Indeed, 
the resources over which the State has control need not even be permanent assets of the public 
sector.235 For example in Air France, the CFI held that funds deposited by private individuals with the 
Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations, a public body established by statute, constituted State resources 
even though the sums deposited could be withdrawn by individual depositors, since the Caisse was able 
to use and invest the available balance at its own risk in the same way as if that investment had been 
financed from taxation or compulsory contributions. This could be directly compared to the situation 
and role of the NCB: part of its funds is derived from the deposits that commercial banks are required 
(in most cases) to keep with the central bank. These deposits can be used by NCB in its day-to-day 
operations, but can also be accessed and withdrawn by the commercial banks on demand. Based on the 
reasoning in Air France, therefore, even this part of the central bank’s resources derived form private 
rather than public sources, may be considered ‘State resources’ as long as they are under State control 
and thus available to the public authorities. 236
Conclusion on the ‘State resources’ criterion
The above analysis sought to follow the rules of the EU state aid regime by adapting the facts 
pertaining to national central banks to the framework that was established by the Commission and the 
Courts. What it shows is that such an analysis is very confusing and is not easy to follow and less so to
apply in practice. This is so because the central banks’ entire being is not easy to classify: they are not 
always public institutions and even when the are (not), they contain elements of public and private (in 
the case of older central banks) entities. Moreover, they are charged with tasks of a public nature, and 
yet on a day-to-day basis engage in various activities that would also be carried out by a commercial 
bank (borrowing, lending, buying and selling). In other words, their classification cannot be ‘neat’ and 
the current framework is ill-adapted to take all the relevant factors into consideration. In the case 
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studies dealt with in this paper, the Commission’s reasoning in qualifying central bank resources as 
state resources was very brief (or at least what was made public, did not include all the conceivable 
considerations, with the Commission seemingly satisfied to operate on the basis of a few presumptions 
– see e.g. the fact that the Danish National Bank “had” to be considered as a public authority or a 
public body and was wholly-owned by the State, immediately qualified its resources as ‘state 
resources’237). Riksbank’s establishment under the Swedish constitution and a special law governing it, 
which provided for its governing board to be appointed by Parliament, also qualified its resources as 
‘State resources’ imputable to the State without further detail on its funding or ownership structure.238
Obviously these factors show the control that the State exercised over Riksbank. However, according to 
the decision in Stardust Marine, it is not sufficient that financial assistance measures are adopted by 
public undertakings under State control of the State - it is necessary to further examine whether the 
public authorities were actually involved in the adoption of the measures.239 For similar reasons, the 
brief treatment of the fact that authorisation by the Chancellor of Exchequer was required before the 
Bank of England could provide ELA to Northern Rock on 14 September 2007 and that this wasn’t 
considered to raise the presumption of ‘State resources’240 and the lack of this reasoning in the decision 
raises some eyebrows. It seems that the resources of a national central bank are ab initio presumed to 
be those of the State, since they are usually created to serve a public function and are, in most cases, 
directly or indirectly controlled by the State through their ownership and corporate governance 
structures. However, as the above analysis and the detail in Annex I show, this cannot be said to be true 
of all of Europe’s national central banks. Therefore, a revision of this criterion specifically for national 
central banks is required, as the state aid rules normally applied differ from the rules that seem to be 
applied to central banks in light of their special status and position in the national economy of a 
Member State.
ADVANTAGE
Assuming that the resources of the NCB are considered to be ‘State resources’ and its actions are 
attributable to the State, it is now necessary to consider whether through the provision of ELA, a 
benefit or an advantage was conferred. There are diverging views as to whether or not ELA constitutes 
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an advantage for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU . On the one hand, a loan is an economic 
advantage, on the other, if this loan is advanced at market rates, there is no specific benefit.241
According to Stasch, since the issue in this respect is essentially whether a measure alleviates a burden 
that an undertaking would normally carry,242 the deciding question with LOLR interventions in the 
form of loans is thus whether the loans are extended as against adequate and fair consideration.243 It 
must therefore be assessed whether penalty interest rates and good collateral represent adequate and 
fair consideration for the loan in question. This approach seems consistent with the Commission’s 
approach in its Carnegie Bank and Rescue aid to Hypo Real Estate decisions, in both of which state aid 
was assessed by reference to the interest rate imposed on the ELA facility and the quality of collateral
with which the facility was secured, holding in both cases that since the collateral advanced was not 
adequate in that it would not normally be accepted by central banks to secure ELA funding, the 
measures constituted state aid.244 However, such an approach is not consistent with the ‘extended 
conception’ of LOLR theory, which is sometimes adopted in practice. According to this ‘extended 
conception’, the requirements of both the interest rates and the collateral could be relaxed (the latter of 
which was incidentally also proposed by Bagehot himself). Some NCBs in the EU even contain express 
provisions that would allow them to do just that.245 Thus, a split standard is evolving: the ‘normal’ (i.e. 
containing elements of the extended conception of LOLR) and the ‘Community-sanctioned’ (or ‘State-
aid consistent’) NCB operations.
A more traditional analysis would entail the examination of the economic nature of an advantage 
and the application of the private market investor (‘PMEI’) test, according to which, if the State or a 
public undertaking is deemed to be acting as a purely commercial actor, akin to a private investor, 
attaching the same terms and conditions to the economic advantage it is conferring on the beneficiary 
undertaking as any private investor would have done under the same or comparable market conditions, 
then such an economic advantage does not constitute aid.246 In the words of Advocate General Slynn in 
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the Van der Kooy case,247 “[i]t is of the essence of a State aid that it is non-commercial in the sense that 
the State steps in where the market would not. The State may have its reasons for doing so but they are 
not commercial in the ordinary sense of the word.” Thus, what matters for this strand of the test is that 
(i) the State is acting commercially as a private or ‘economically rational’248 investor; (ii) under normal 
or comparable market conditions.249 However, in application to ELA and more generally to the LOLR 
function of a central bank, both of these notions raise several problems of interpretation and may even 
be irreconcilable with practice. 
(i) NCB acting commercially as a private investor
The question here is whether the advantage in question is one which would or could have been 
obtained from a commercial actor, acting with a view to obtaining a normal return within a reasonable 
period of time.250 The practical difficulty with this analysis is that the ultimate reason why the central 
bank is intervening in providing liquidity to an illiquid bank or even the market as a whole, is that such 
liquidity can no longer be obtained on the interbank market251. In such circumstances, the central 
bank’s motivation in providing this liquidity is not so much the commercial expectation of a return, but 
the need to liquidise the markets, boost confidence in the banking sector and to prevent the collapse of 
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individual illiquid institutions and the spread of systemic risk through contagion effect. Thus, the 
central bank is acting more in its role of a regulator rather than a simple market participant. According 
to Bacon, these regulatory functions have to be taken into account in determining whether there is an 
advantage within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU ,252 as this mixed role (regulatory and market 
participant) may indicate that the decision to provide ELA was not motivated purely by objective 
economic considerations, but was also influenced by political concerns.253
Therefore, a critique may be advanced in relation to the application to the NCB of the private 
market economy investor test. First, the NCB cannot be compared to a PMEI since it is “in a unique 
position on the market”254 for last-resort loans. Moreover, its resources could be said to be unlimited (it 
holds a monopoly on issuing money, controls monetary policy and sometimes, its losses could be 
underwritten by the State255). According to the judgment in the Chronopost case, if the State’s actions 
cannot be compared with those of a private undertaking, because the State undertaking enjoys a 
monopoly256, or because for any other reason there are not private undertakings active in the market, 
then the Commission must try to develop other standards of comparison.257 However, in the cases 
dealing with central bank interventions in the form of ELA, no such “other standard of comparison” is 
apparent to date, with the Commission still comparing the conduct of the NCB with that of a PMEI.258
Second, the NCB is not comparable to a PMEI, because at least in relation to its LOLR function, it 
exercises its duties as a public authority, taking considerations other than commercial ones into account  
(such as, notably, the stability of the financial system), which is incompatible with the PMEI test. As 
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was previously held by the Court of Justice, when considering whether a PMEI would have chosen to 
make an investment rather than allow the liquidation of an undertaking, only the obligations that the 
State would have to assume as the investor may be taken into account, without considering the social 
and other costs which would have been incurred by it as a public authority (i.e. the cost of redundancies 
and payment of unemployment benefits).  In the case of the NCB, however, these ‘extraneous’ costs 
and considerations that it might have to incur if it does not grant ELA to the requesting bank, are 
almost exclusively the factors that motivate its decision. This would include, but are not limited to, the 
consideration of the effects and the repercussions that the failure of the bank would have on the 
economy as a whole and the costs which would then accrue in the form of ELA requests by other banks, 
government-coordinated bailouts, and the support that would be required to minimise the costs of 
contractions in the real economy. Even if the majority of these costs are more likely to be borne by the 
State than the NCB itself, the NCB may suffer ‘reputation costs’ for its failure to prevent a bank 
failure/crisis and, given that the majority of NCB appointments are political (in that the decision-
making boards and the chairperson/governor/president of the NCB are in the majority of cases 
appointed by the State) such reputation costs are unlikely to be incurred lightly. 
Third, the PMEI test has been developed mainly with equity investments in mind,  that tend to be 
medium – to – long-term investments with an expectation of a “reasonable return within a reasonable 
time”. ELA, on the other hand, is a debt investment and is (and should) only be provided on a short-
term basis. The expectations of profit are therefore rather different and, under normal circumstances, 
cannot be adequately compared. It is true that recently in cases involving state aid in the form of a loan, 
the Commission started referring to its standard as the “private market economy lender”259, though it is 
unclear if this is just a change in the name or if any substantive differences exist between this and the 
usual PMEI test. In terms of the “investment’s” long-term prospects, it could be argued that NCB’s 
motivation in providing ELA is to allow the beneficiary bank to sort out its finances and thus improve 
its stability, for the maintenance of which the beneficiary will be responsible itself in the long run (i.e. 
where it cannot recover, it can be liquidated in an orderly fashion so as to contain systemic risk, 
otherwise it can return back to viability by selling some of its assets, for which it would not have been 
able to obtain a normal market price if it were forced, without ELA, to sell them at “fire prices”). Thus, 
though the ultimate goal for NCB intervention is to enable the beneficiary to be returned to viability in 
the long run, the NCB’s actual “investment” with the beneficiary is short-term and thus its expectations 
of returns cannot be compared to that of a PMEI, since the lender expects a high return within a 
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relatively short time based on the agreed interest rate, whereas an equity investor would expect 
relatively small, sometimes sporadically allocated, return based on the residual interest of its equity 
holding.
(ii) ELA provided under normal market conditions
In considering the question of whether or not ELA was provided “under normal market 
conditions”, it is necessary to consider if “under similar circumstances, a private investor of a size 
comparable to the public body in question would have provided capital of such an amount” and on such 
terms,260 and if not, on what terms it might have done so.261 However, as was noted above, in the case 
of NCBs, there exists no such private investor of a comparable size with comparable resources. 
Moreover, even a lender of comparable size with comparable resources would have existed on the 
interbank market, the fact that the NCB was approached by the requesting bank which accepts the ELA 
at a higher rate of interest than what is offered on the interbank market, already indicates that no lender 
on the interbank market was willing to lend to it, under any terms, either because they consider 
(perhaps falsely262) that the requesting bank  is insolvent, or because they are hoarding their cash due to 
lack of confidence in the market.
In this context, it is necessary to consider the market conditions which prevail at the time that 
ELA was granted. Such conditions could not be described as “normal”. Conditions on the loan market 
could be characterised as “normal” when both counterparties (the lender and the borrower) are able to 
accurately assess each other’s financial situations so as to enter into a beneficially mutual transactions 
on terms acceptable to both parties and in the most efficient way possible. Certainly then, where due to 
market failure, vast information asymmetries arise and the lenders are no longer able to accurately 
asses the risk that a particular transaction would entail and, as a result, a borrower that would be 
considered suitable in a comparable situation absent the market failure, is unable to obtain the loan on 
the same conditions, this signifies that the conditions prevailing at that time are no longer “normal”. If 
they were, the bank would not be requesting ELA, since it would have been able to obtain the funding 
it sought on the interbank market “under normal conditions”, and therefore one would invariably reach 
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the conclusion that no advantage is present.263 Such a conclusion would, however, be erroneous, since 
the mere fact of being granted ELA is already an advantage in itself, for without it the bank faces a real 
risk of failure. Therefore, the inquiry into, and the comparison with, “normal market conditions” is 
useless in the present context.
If one were instead to apply the “similar market conditions” criterion, one would nevertheless 
encounter conceptual difficulties. For example, this test would require one to vest the hypothetical 
private market economy lender not just with attributes of comparable size and resources as the NCB, 
but also with access to the same information as is available to the LOLR at the time. 264 Therefore, at 
least hypothetically, if the only reason why the borrower is unable to finance itself on the interbank 
market is because market failure introduced false information about its financial situation, the reality of 
which is known to the NCB, which acts accordingly, then this knowledge must also be attributed to the 
hypothetical lender. In reality, however, most NCBs do not possess more accurate information than the 
market, unless they are also charged with the task of supervising financial institutions265 and if such a 
review was recently carried out. If not, empirical evidence suggests that the market actually possesses 
more accurate information about its participants than does the NCB.266 In most cases, therefore, the 
hypothetical private market economy lender would have to be vested with even less information about 
the borrower than what the real private economy market participant would actually have. This would 
seem to lead to inadequate results, not least for the qualification of “normal market conditions” and, 
ultimately, the “advantage granted”, since with even less accurate information about the borrower than 
what is available to the real market, the hypothetical lender would be more likely to err in its 
assessment of the risks involved in the transaction, which would lead to gross inconsistencies in the 
application of this test.
Conclusion on Advantage
The arguments advanced here highlight the problems that arise in the application of the “private 
market economy investor/lender” principle and the criterion of “normal market conditions”. Neither of 
these tests seems to be adequate to assess the particular characteristics of LOLR support. And even if 
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one would dispense with the details of this test and concentrate solely on the definition of “advantage”, 
one cannot help but disagree with the Commission’s reasoning that as long as the conditions imposed 
are equal to, or go beyond, what is required on the interbank market (i.e. adequate collateral is 
demanded and penalty interest rates are imposed) or by reference to NCB repo rate, no advantage 
would be involved. It is therefore submitted that the mere grant of ELA, no matter how onerous the 
terms, is already an advantage in itself, since without it the bank faces a real risk of failure, and thus, its 
position with ELA is improved relative to the position it would be without it.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
As can be seen from the above, the new ‘in crisis’ framework was designed to better tackle the 
problems that arose out of the financial crisis. It enabled the Member States and the Commission to act 
more swiftly in developing appropriate and effective measures to minimise the effects of the crisis on 
the economies of the Member States whilst at the same time ensuring that competition in the banking 
sector is not unduly distorted. These developments were timely and welcome (although one could only 
wish that such a framework was already available when the financial crisis started, but even without it, 
the Commission seems to have justified most of the measures notified to it on the basis of their 
compatibility with Article 107(3)(c) TFEU ). 
The position advanced in this paper was that the ‘in crisis’ framework, in so far as it applies to 
ELA, mirrors classical LOLR requirements of solvency, adequate collateral, penalty interest rates and a 
decision adopted at the NCB’s discretion. However, as was noted above267, current NCB practice often 
departs from these classical Bagehot rules. This means that situations may arise where the NCB 
believes that it is performing its LOLR function which is not subject to EU state aid control, whereas 
the Commission would not necessarily share this opinion. This type of ELA would then be classified as 
“state aid”, even if the NCB is by statute authorised to act this way in accordance with its statutorily 
(and sometimes constitutionally) guaranteed independence and does so without any instructions from 
the government.
Certain inconsistencies or difficulties in the analysis of ELA under the ‘no crisis’ framework 
(i.e. following the traditional state aid analysis) were also exemplified in the sections on  the ‘state 
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resources’ and ‘advantage’ criteria. The conclusion that may be drawn from this are that the ‘no crisis’ 
framework is ill-adapted to assess ELA. However, though the ‘in crisis’ framework is already an 
improvement, it is not without its faults.
The ‘in crisis’ framework could only be used once the Commission was satisfied that the crisis 
at issue was serious enough (in other words systemic) to justify the use of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU as a 
legal basis, to allow for the adoption of measures “to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a 
Member State” (in other words, to restore financial stability). However, one could argue that at least in 
relation ELA, this legal basis ought to have been available sooner, since it is the NCBs who are 
entrusted with the task of maintaining stability of the financial system. It should therefore be up to them 
to determine whether or not financial stability is threatened by the troubles experienced by a particular 
institution (or several institutions). Given the absence of a universally accepted definition of the 
concepts “financial stability” and “systemic stability”, which even the central bankers acknowledge to 
be “slightly vague and difficult to define”268, it should fall within the individual NCB’s competence to 
determine what this means for their financial markets. However, NCB’s “gut feeling” about the 
meaning of financial stability for their financial markets may not be consistent with the Commission’s 
idea of threat to the financial stability, since it has so far shown itself to be rather conservative in 
defining this notion. For example, the Commission did not consider Crédit Lyonnais to be systemically 
relevant, even though at the time, it was the biggest European bank in terms of assets,269 so it refused to 
apply Article 107(3)(b) TFEU , because the systemic crisis had not yet occurred. 
The Commission considers that a crisis can only be classified as “systemic” where all the banks, 
or a large part of the sector, are facing difficulties. Only this type of “systemic crisis” would, according 
to the Commission, justify state intervention, whereas in a situation where only a few banks have 
isolated problems, no systemic risk could be conceived.270 However, it has recently become apparent 
that the collapse of even one financial institution, that is “too connected to fail”, such as was the case of 
Lehman Brothers, could lead to a systemic crisis.271 Similarly, if one is to recall the basic principles of 
the theory on bank runs, it becomes apparent that the failure of any one bank may, potentially, lead to 
failure of others. History shows that the failure of several small firms, as in the post-BCCI “small 
banks” (or, as they’re also commonly known as, “fringe banks”) crisis in the UK, could be just as 
                                                
268 Lars Heikensten, Speech at the Risk Management Conference, Swedish Riksbank, Stockholm, 16 November 2004, 
available at www.riskbank.com
269 Schütte (2001), op cit n.148, p.376
270 See Competition Report (1994)
271 Howard Davies and David Green, Banking on the Future: The Fall and Rise of Central Banking (2010, Princeton 
University Press), p.58
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threatening to systemic stability as a failure of a TBTF bank.272 Thus, the Commission’s reasoning in 
Crédit Lyonnais was criticised, since “if Article 87(3)(b) can be applied in the case of a systemic crisis 
in the banking sector, it should equally apply in cases where crises would arise in the absence of 
immediate state intervention. There is no reason to wait until the crisis has effectively occurred”.273
Indeed, waiting until the tell-tale signs of systemic crisis appear could have disastrous results. Instead, 
intervention should be allowed to prevent systemic crisis from occurring.
In light of the foregoing, it is submitted that maybe the time has come to develop a specially 
tailored set of rules to the LOLR function of the NCBs, when they are concerned with systemic risk 
and contagion effects. Current state aid rules can be, and have been, adapted reasonably well to 
situations where the State itself bails a bank out (through the provision of loans or State guarantees or 
outright transfer of ownership to the State). However, the situation is different when it is the central 
bank that is performing its statutory duty in safeguarding monetary and financial stability 
independently of government instructions, using its own resources and needing to do so quickly and 
without unnecessary delay and sometimes to such an amount that would cause a public outrage if it 
came directly from the governments’ coffers. Given the sensitivity of the financial markets to 
information about the provision of ELA to some banks, it is often desirable that this information is not 
disclosed and remains confidential between the beneficiary and the central bank and the speed with 
which ELA requests should be dealt with in an ‘in crisis’ situation make the requirement of prior 
notification of state aid impractical. In light of these considerations, it is submitted here, the Council 
should consider exercising its right under Article 107(3)(e) TFEU in regulating this particular situation 
with a set of sui generis rules. When the central bank is exercising its discretion within the limits of the 
authority allowed to it both under national and EU rules, which inter alia guarantee its independence in 
the field of monetary policy operations, it should be free to choose any policy and tools available to it.
This may include lowering the interest rates or the quality of collateral it deems acceptable to a 
particular situation, if it considers that such measures are warranted by the particular circumstances of
the case. Similarly, where instead of collateral the beneficiary’s liability towards the central bank is 
secured by means of a State guarantee, this should be of no relevance to the ‘business’ decision that the 
central bank takes – all that the NCB must be concerned with is that its measures serve to stabilise the 
market and contain systemic risk and that it does not take on an unjustifiable credit risk (against which 
it is insulated by means of a State guarantee). In this scenario, it is the State guarantee which should be 
assessed under the normal state aid rules and as to its compatibility with the common market, not the 
                                                
272 Davies and Green (2010), op cit n.271, p.58
273 Schütte (2001), op cit n.148, p.379
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ELA facility (which would already constitute an ‘advantage’ under the traditional state aid analysis). 
Moreover, the central bank should not be concerned with the effect that its decision will have on the 
classification of this measure as state aid and thus the potential risk that the recovery of this aid be 
ordered at a later stage. Admittedly, the normal state aid rules should apply in circumstances where the 
central bank was ordered to provide ELA to a bank that it would not have supported but for 
governmental instructions. Furthermore, the distinction between the set of rules governing ‘in crisis’ 
and ‘no-crisis’ situations do not make sense from the central bank’s LOLR perspective, as the failure of 
one bank alone could cause a systemic crisis and the NCB should not be required to wait until this 
happens for measures to be taken against such an event, just so that it can be certain that the measure 
will not be caught by Article 107(1) TFEU .
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ANNEX II
NCB Legal 
Status and 
Ownership 
Structure
Statutory policy 
objectives and 
functions
Corporate Governance Structure 
Provisions for NCB 
Independence
Provisions for 
LOLR 
Austria – Member Since 1995 - Oesterreichische Nationalbank
Stock corporation
(NBG274 Art.2(1) on 
legal status and 
Arts.8 and 9 on 
capital and 
shareholders) 
wholly owned by 
the State since its 
full nationalisation 
in May 2010275
Price stability
(NBG Art.2(2)); 
financial stability
(NBG 44(b)); 
payment system 
(NBG Art.50) 
General Council: President, Vice 
President and 12 other members: 6 
appointed by the Austrian federal 
government; and 6 elected by the General 
Meeting (NBG Arts.22 and 23)
Governing Board: Governor, Vice 
Governor and 2 other members – all 
appointed by the Federal President of 
Austria on a proposal of the government 
(NBG Art.33)
Freedom from 
instructions (NBG 
Art.2(5) Art.34) 
Belgium – Founding Member - Nationale Bank van België/Banque nationale de Belgique
Public institution
with public limited 
liability company 
(société anonyme) 
status, 50% of 
share capital owned 
by the State
(OANBoB276 Art.4). 
Special legal status
and special organs
and operating rules 
which distinguish it 
from other public 
limited liability 
companies.277
Objectives of the 
ESCB (OANBoB
Arts.2 and 5) –
implied monetary 
stability
Financial stability
(OANBoB Art. 
12)
Board or Directors: (administration, 
management and policy-setting -
OANBoB Art.19(2)) Governor 
(appointed by the King), 5-7 Directors, 
incl. Vice-Governor (appointed by the 
King, on the proposal of the Council of 
Regency - OANBoB Art.23(1)) 
(OANBoB Art.19)
Council of Regency: Governor, the 
directors and 10 regents, elected by the 
General Meeting – 5 on the proposal of 
the most representative labour and other 
organizations, and 5 on the proposal of 
the Minister of Finance (OANBoB
Art.23(3))
Minister of Finance has 
the right to supervise 
the Bank and oppose 
any measure contrary to 
the law or the interests 
of the State, except in 
relation to ESCB tasks 
(OANBoB   Art.22) 
Independence (same 
degree as that 
determined by Art.108 
EC) in all financial 
stability related 
decision-making 
((OANBoB Art. 12).
Bulgaria – Member Since 2007 - Българската народна банка (Bulgarian National Bank)
“independent
issuing institution 
of the State”278
Price stability
(LBNB279 Art.2);  
efficient payments 
system, 
supervision of 
banks to ensure 
stability of the 
banking system
and protect 
depositors.
Governing Council: (management –
LBNB Art.10) consists the Governor 
(elected by the National Assembly –
LBNB Art.12(1)), the three Deputy 
Governors (elected by the National 
Assembly on the proposal of the 
Governor – LBNB Art.12(2)), and three 
other members (appointed by the 
President of the Republic – LBNB 
Art.12(3)).
Independence and 
freedom from 
instructions (LBNB 
Art.44); BUT: 
Minister of Finance 
replenishes the Bank’s 
statutory fund to cover 
the deficit, if the Bank’s 
reserve resources under 
Art.36(1) have been 
exhausted (LBNB 
Art.9) -> financial 
independence?
LOLR by Banking 
Dept under the 
terms of LBNB 
Governing Council 
regulations in case 
of systemic risk & 
threat to fin. 
stability (LBNB  
Art.20(2))
Cyprus – Member since 2004 - Κεντρική Τράπεζα της Κύπρου (Central Bank of Cyprus)
                                                
274 1984 Nationalbank Act – NBG (Federal Act on the Oesterreichische Nationalbank ), Article 2(1) on legal status, Articles 8 and 9 on 
capital and shareholders; http://www.oenb.at/en/ueber_die_oenb/about_the_oenb.jsp ;
275 http://diepresse.com/home/wirtschaft/economist/kordiconomy/573056/index.do; until 2006 the Nationalbank was owned 50/50 by 
government/private shareholders; from 2006: 70/30 government/shareholders (http://www.boerse-express.com/pages/846668)
276 Organic Act of the National Bank of Belgium dated 22 February 1998
277 http://www.nbb.be/pub/01_00_00_00_00/01_02_00_00_00/01_02_01_00_00.htm?l=en
278 http://www.bnb.bg/AboutUs/index.htm
279 Law on the Bulgarian National Bank (as amended; Darjaven Vestnik, issue 10 of 2005)
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NCB Legal 
Status and 
Ownership 
Structure
Statutory policy 
objectives and 
functions
Corporate Governance Structure 
Provisions for NCB 
Independence
Provisions for 
LOLR 
Corporate body
(CBCL280 Art.3) not 
subject to Company 
Law (CBCL
Art.68(1)), wholly 
owned by the State
(CBCL Art.56(1))
Price stability
(CBCL Art.5(1)); 
bank supervision; 
payment and 
settlement 
systems; and 
financial stability
Board of Directors: Governor, the 
Deputy Governor and five directors, all 
appointed by the Council of Ministers 
(CBCL Art.13(1))
Freedom from 
instructions (CBCL 
Art.7); financial 
independence (CBCL 
Art.58(1))
Czech Republic – Member since 2004 - Česká národní banka (Czech National Bank)
Legal entity under
public law, with 
powers of an 
administrative and 
supervisory
authority (ACNB281
Art.1); profits revert 
to the government 
(Art.47(2))
Price stability; 
financial stability; 
payments systems
(ACNB Art.2);  
and supervision
(ACNB Arts.2 
(2)(d) and 44); 
Bank Board: Governor, two Vice-
Governors and 4 other members, all of 
whom are appointed by the President of 
the Republic (ACNB Art.6(1))
Freedom from 
instructions (ACNB 
Art.9(1));  Minister of 
Finance may attend 
Board meetings in an 
advisory capacity and 
submit motions for 
discussion (Art.11(1))
Exceptional short-
term credit for up 
to 3 months 
against adequate 
collateral 
(Art.29(2))
Denmark – Member since 1973 - Danmarks Nationalbank
Special status as a 
self-governing 
institution under 
government 
supervision282, 
whose profits revert 
to the state 
treasury.283
Safe and secure 
currency system; 
payment system; 
extension of credit 
(DNbA Art.1)
Board of Directors: 25 members, 8 with 
a seat at the Rigsdag, 2 appointed by the 
Minister of Trade, Industry and Shipping 
and 15 elected by the entire Board of 
Directors (DNbA284 Art.2)
Committee of Directors: 2 Directors 
appointed by the Minister of Trade, 5 
elected by the Board from among its 
members. Minister of Trade approves the 
election of a Chairman and Deputy 
Chairman (DNbA Art.5)
Board of Governors (daily 
management): 3 members - 1 nominated 
by the King, 2 appointed by the Board on 
Committee’s recommendation (DNbA
Art.6)
Minister of Trade, 
supervises the Bank, 
presides at Board of 
Directors meetings, 
where no decisions of 
particularly far-reaching 
character can be taken 
when he is not present, 
unless he was informed 
in advance (DNbA, 
Art.7); he also appoints 
2 Chartered 
Accountants to audit the 
Bank’s annual accounts
(By-laws285  § 37)
Estonia – Member since 2004 - Eesti Pank (Bank of Estonia)
Legal person 
(EPA286 Art.1(2)) 
and an independent 
constitutional 
institution287
Price stability
(EPA Art.2(1))
Supervisory Board: Chairman 
(appointed by the Riigikogu on the 
proposal of the President of the Republic 
– Art.7) and 7 members (appointed by the 
Riigikogu on the proposal of the 
Chairman – Art.8)
Executive Board: Governor (appointed 
by President of the Republic on the 
proposal of the Supervisory – Art.10) and 
Deputy Governors (EPA Art.13(1)).
Independence and 
autonomy from the 
government and other 
executive state agencies 
(EPA Art.3(1)); the 
Bank and the 
government are  not 
liable for each other’s  
financial liabilities288
Finland – Member since 1995 - Suomen Pankki - Finlands Bank
                                                
280 Central Bank of Cyprus Laws of 2002-2007 (http://www.centralbank.gov.cy/media/pdf/LFLWE_CBCLAW0508.pdf)
281 Act No. 6/1993 Coll. on the Czech National Bank
282 Under the Danmarks Nationalbank Act 1936 (‘DNbA’) the Bank was restructured from a limited liability company to an independent 
institution (http://www.nationalbanken.dk/dnuk/hist.nsf/side/Danmarks_Nationalbank_Act) 
283 http://www.nationalbanken.dk/DNUK/AboutUs.nsf/side/Accounts!OpenDocument
284 National Bank of Denmark Act
285 By-laws of the National Bank of Denmark
286 Eesti Pank Act, Passed 18 May 1993 (RT1 I 1993, 28, 498)
287 http://www.bankofestonia.info/pub/en/yldine/pank/eestipank/index.html?ok=1
288 http://www.bankofestonia.info/pub/en/yldine/pank/eestipank/index.html?ok=1
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NCB Legal 
Status and 
Ownership 
Structure
Statutory policy 
objectives and 
functions
Corporate Governance Structure 
Provisions for NCB 
Independence
Provisions for 
LOLR 
Independent 
institution governed 
by public law
(ABF289 Sec.1) 
owned by the State
Price stability
(ABF Sec.2)
Board: Governor (appointed by the 
President), up to 5 other members 
(appointed by the Supervisory Council), 
9 members elected by Parliament 
(Sec.10)). 
Freedom from 
instructions (ABF 
Sec.4) 
France – Founding Member - Banque de France (Bank of France)
An institution
whose capital 
belongs to the State
(SBoF290 Art. L142-
1) since its 
nationalisation in 
1945291
Price stability
(SBoF Article 
L141-1); 
payments system
(SBoF Article 
L141-4)
General Council: Governor and 2 
Deputy Governors (appointed by Cabinet 
Decree – Art. L.142-3); 2 members 
appointed by the President of the 
National Assembly; 2 members 
appointed by the President of the Senate, 
2 members appointed by a Cabinet 
Decree on proposal by the minister of 
economy, and an elected representative 
of the Bank's employees (Art. L142-3) 
Freedom from 
instructions (Article 
L141-1)
Independence (Article 
L142-3) 
Germany – Founding Member – Deutsche Bundesbank
Federal institution
governed by public 
law, owned by the 
State (GDB292
Art.2); with special 
status of a supreme 
federal authority 
(GDB Art.29)
Price stability
(GDB Art.3); 
payment and 
clearing systems 
(GDB Art.3)
Executive Board: President, the Vice-
President and 4 other members, all 
appointed by the President of Germany 
on the nomination of the Federal 
Government for the President, Vice-
President and 1 member, and of the 
Bundesrat  in agreement with the Federal 
Government for the other 3 members 
(GDB Art.7) 
Independence and 
freedom from 
instructions (GDB 
Ar.12) 
Greece – Member since 1981 – Η Τράπεζα της Ελλάδος (Bank of Greece)
Corporation
(Société Anonyme) 
(SBoG293 Art.1); 
State or public 
enterprises cannot 
hold capital to the 
amount exceeding 
35% (SBoG Art.8)
Price stability
(SBoG Art.4);
payment system 
(SBoG Art.2(e)); 
prudential 
supervision , 
financial stability 
(SBoG Art.55A)
Monetary Policy Council: Governor and 
2 Deputy Governors and 3 members (all 
appointed by the President on a proposal 
of the Council of Ministers– SboG 
Arts.29(3) and 35A)
General Council: (general 
management): Monetary Policy Council 
+ 6 Councillors, elected by the 
Shareholders (SBoG Art.21)
Freedom from 
instructions (SBoG 
Art.5A)
Hungary – Member since 2004 - Magyar Nemzeti Bank
Company limited 
by shares
(AMNB294 CH.IV 
Art.46(1), all of 
which are owned by 
the State (AMNB 
Ch.IV Art.46(4))
Price stability
(AMNB Ch.I 
Art.3(1)); implied 
financial stability 
(AMNB Ch. I 
Art.4(7)); 
Monetary Council: Governor and 
Deputy Governors, appointed by the 
President on PM’s and Governor’s 
proposal respectively (AMNB Ch.IV 
Art.50(3) and Art.51(1)); up to 4 
members, appointed by the President.
Supervisory Board: Chairman and other 
members (elected by Parliament), a 
Minister representative and a consultant 
commissioned by the Minister (AMNB 
Ch.IV Art.52A(4)).
Independence and 
freedom from 
instructions (AMNB 
Ch.I Art.1(2)); 
Independence in 
monetary policy setting 
and implementation 
(AMNB Ch.II Art.6)
ELA subject to 
FSA’s actions 
(AMNB Ch.II 
Art.14)
                                                
289 Act on the Bank of Finland NO. 214/1998
290 Statute of the Bank of France
291 http://www.banque-france.fr/gb/instit/histoire/histor3.htm
292 Bundesbank Act (Gesetz über die Deutsche Bundesbank)
293 Statute of the Bank of Greece (9th edition, 2000)
294 Act LVIII of 2001 on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank
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NCB Legal 
Status and 
Ownership 
Structure
Statutory policy 
objectives and 
functions
Corporate Governance Structure 
Provisions for NCB 
Independence
Provisions for 
LOLR 
Ireland – Member since 1973 - Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland
Body corporate
(ICBA295 Art.5(2)) 
owned by the State
(ICBA Art. 9) with a 
semi-autonomous 
entity for financial 
regulation.
Safeguarding the 
integrity of the 
currency (ICBA 
Art.6(1) 
Board of Directors (management –
ICBA Art.53)): Governor (appointed by 
the President on the advice of the 
Government – ICBA Art.19(1)), 3 
banking Directors and other Directors as 
determined and appointed by the Minister 
of Finance (ICBA Art.23(1)).
Independence in the 
field of monetary policy 
implied by virtue of its 
membership of the 
ESCB
Italy – Founding Member - Banca d’Italia (Bank of Italy)
Iinstitution
incorporated under 
public law (SBI296
Art.1) whose shares
are held by private 
corporations (mainly 
banks)297
Monetary and 
financial 
stability298
Board of Directors: (administration, 
management supervision and internal 
control of the Bank – SBI Art.18) 
Governor (by the President of the 
Republic on a proposal from the 
President of the Council of Ministers) 
and 13 directors elected by shareholders 
(SBI Art.15)
Autonomy, 
independence and 
freedom from 
instructions (SBI 
Art.1)
Latvia – Member since 2004 - Latvijas Banka (Bank of Latvia)
State institution
(LBoL299 Art.1)
Price stability
(LBoL Art.3); 
payments system
(LBoL Art.9(1))
Council: (administration - (LBoL 
Art.21(1)): Governor (appointed by the 
Saeima of the Republic of Latvia – LBoL 
Art.22(1)), the Deputy Governor and 6 
other members of the Council (appointed 
by the Saeima upon the recommendation 
of the Governor of the Bank of Latvia –
LBoL Art.22(2)) 
Freedom from 
instructions (LBoL 
Art.13(1)); 
independence in 
decision-making (LBoL 
Art.13(2)) BUT: Bank 
is supervised by the 
Saeima (Art.43(1))
Lithuania – Member since 2004 - Lietuvos bankas (Bank of Lithuania)
Legal person 
(LBoLit300 Art.2(1)) 
belongs to the State
of Lithuania 
(Art.1(1)), capital is 
accumulated from 
the funds of the 
State of Lithuania 
(Art.20(2))
Price stability
(LBoLit Art.7(1))
Bank Board: Chairperson (appointed by 
the Seimas on the recommendation of the 
President of the Republic – LBoLit 
Art.10(3)), 2 Deputy Chairpersons, and 2 
Members of the Board (appointed by the 
President of the Republic of Lithuania on 
the recommendation of the Chairperson –
LboLit Art.10(4)).
Independence and
freedom from 
instructions (Art.3), 
freedom to choose and 
implement monetary 
policy (Art.25); Bank 
and the State are not 
liable for each others’ 
obligations (Art.1(4))
Luxembourg – Founding Member - Banque centrale du Luxembourg
Public institution, 
(OLBCdL301
Art.3(1)) whose 
only shareholder is 
the State (OLBCdL 
Art.4(1))
Execution ESCB 
tasks; supervision 
of  liquidity; 
payment system
(OLBCdL Art.2)
Council: composed of Directors (ex 
officio members) and 6 members 
appointed by the Government (OLBCdL 
Art.7(1))
Executive Board: Director-General and 
2 Directors,  appointed by the Grand 
Duke on a proposal by the Government 
(Art.12)
Freedom from 
instructions (OLBCdL 
Art.5(2)); financial 
autonomy (OLBCdL 
Art.3(1))
Malta – Member since 2004 – Central Bank of Malta
Body corporate Price stability Board of Directors: (policy and general Freedom from Exceptional grant 
                                                
295 Irish Central Bank Act 1942
296 Statute of the Bank of Italy (2006)
297 http://www.bancaditalia.it/bancaditalia/funzgov/gov/partecipanti/Shareholders.pdf
298 http://www.bancaditalia.it/bancaditalia/funzgov/funzioni
299 Law "On the Bank of Latvia" of 19 May 1992 (English translation accessible at http://www.bank.lv/eng/main/all/lvbank/llb/ )
300 Law on the Bank of Lithuania of 1 December 1994 (As last amended on 10 December 2009 ─ No XI-557) (English translation 
accessible at http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter3/dokpaieska.showdoc_e?p_id=364109&p_query=&p_tr2=)
301 Organic Law of the Banque Centrale du Luxembourg (Consolidated Version of 2009)
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LOLR 
with a distinct legal 
personality 
(CBMA302 Art.3(2)) 
owned by the 
government (CBMA 
Art.19(1))
(CBMA Art.4); 
Financial stability
(CBMA Art.5(c))
administration): Governor and Deputy 
Governor (appointed by the President of 
Malta, acting on the advice of the Prime 
Minister - CBMA Art.8(1)) and the 3 
other directors appointed by the Prime 
Minister (CBMA Arts.7 and 9)
instructions (CBMA 
Art.5(2))
of loans against 
security considered 
appropriate by the 
Board, to 
safeguard financial 
stability
(CBMA 
Art.17(1)(g))
The Netherlands – Founding Member - De Nederlandsche Bank
Public limited 
company303 and 
“independent public 
body”304 that was 
nationalised in 
1948305
Price stability
(NBA306 Sec.2(1) 
and AABoN307
Art.3(1)); other 
functions defined 
in NBA Sec.3, 
including 
prudential 
supervision of 
financial 
institutions.
Governing Board (management –
AABoN Art.6): President and 3-5 
Executive Directors appointed by Royal 
Decree (NBA Sec.12)
Supervisory Board (supervision, 
management and adoption of annual 
accounts – NBA Sec.13): 9-12 members 
(1 is appointed by the Government), 
Chairman and the other members 
appointed by the shareholders (NBA 
Sec.13; AABoN Art.11)
Bank Council: 11-13 members, incl. the 
member of the Supervisory Board 
appointed by the Government, a member 
appointed by the Supervisory Board from 
among its own members; 9-11 members 
appointed by the Bank Council (NBA 
Sec.15 and AABoN Art.17)
Independence in the 
field of monetary policy 
implied by virtue of its 
membership of the 
ESCB (reference to 
ESCB Statute in the 
preface to the Bank Act 
1998)
Poland – Member since 2004 - Narodowy Bank Polski (National Bank of Poland)
Institution with 
exclusive right to 
issue money (Polish 
Constitution 
Art.227), whose 
funds consist of 
registered equity and 
reserve fund, 
derived from public 
resources (ANBP308
Arts.60-69)
Price stability
(ANBP Art.3(1)); 
financial stability
(ANBP 
Art.3(2)(6)(a))
Monetary Policy Council: President 
(appointed and dismissed by the Sejm, at 
the request of the President of the 
Republic of Poland -ANBP Art.9), 9 
members appointed in equal numbers by 
the President of the Republic of Poland, 
the Sejm and the Senate (ANBP Art.13)
Management Board: President of the 
NBP and 6-8 eight Board members, incl. 
two Vice Presidents appointed and 
dismissed by the President of the 
Republic of Poland, at the request of the 
President of the NBP (ANBP Art.17)
Independence implied 
from the Polish 
Constitution Art.227 
and through 
membership of the 
ESCB
Regulating banks’ 
liquidity and 
provision of 
refinancing 
facilities (ANBP 
Art.3(2)(5)); in the 
form of loans 
against pledge of 
securities (Art.42)
Portugal – Member since 1986 - Banco de Portugal
Legal person 
governed by public 
law, with 
administrative and 
financial autonomy
able to own property 
(OLBdP309 Art.1); 
Implied price 
stability: ESCB 
objectives tasks 
(OLBdP Art.3(2)); 
Financial stability
(OLBdP 
Art.12(c)); 
Board of Directors: Governor, one or 
two Vice-governors, and 3-5 Directors 
(OLBdP Art.33), all appointed by means 
of a resolution of the Cabinet, upon 
proposal of the Finance Minister (OLBdP 
Art.27(1))
Board of Auditors: 3 members 
Independence and 
freedom from 
instructions of the 
Governor and the other 
members of the Board 
of Directors (OLBdP 
Art.27(2)); 
LOLR function 
with a view to 
preserving 
financial stability 
(OLBdP Art.12(c))
                                                
302 Central Bank of Malta Act, ACT XXXI of 1967, as amended
303 http://www.dnb.nl/en/about-dnb/index.jsp
304 http://www.dnb.nl/en/about-dnb/organisation/legal-and-organisational-form/index.jsp
305 http://www.dnb.nl/en/news-and-publications/news-and-archive/speeches-2002/auto38626.jsp
306 (Netherlands) Bank Act 1998
307 Articles of Association of the Bank of the Netherlands
308 The Act on the National Bank of Poland of 29 August 1997 (Consolidated text)
309 Organic Law of the Banco de Portugal, Art  1
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NCB Legal 
Status and 
Ownership 
Structure
Statutory policy 
objectives and 
functions
Corporate Governance Structure 
Provisions for NCB 
Independence
Provisions for 
LOLR 
was nationalised in 
1974
payment systems
(OLBdP Art.14); 
supervision
(OLBdP Art.17)
appointed by the Finance Minister 
(OLBdP Art.41)
Advisory Board: Governor, Vice-
governors, former Governors, 4 members 
appointed by the Cabinet, upon proposal 
of the Finance Minister (OLBdP 
Art.47(2)); Chairman of the Portuguese 
Association of Banks; Chairman of the 
Public Credit Management Institute; 
representative of each of the Autonomous 
Regions of the Azores and Madeira, 
Chairman of the Advisory Board of the 
Bank (Art.47) 
Administrative and 
financial autonomy
(OLBdP Art.1); Bank 
cannot guarantee State 
or public body 
commitments (OLBdP 
Art.18(2)).
Romania – Member since 2007 - Banca Naţională a României (National Bank of Romania)
Independent public 
institution with 
legal personality 
(LSNBR310 Art.1) 
that is fully state-
owned (LSNBR 
Art.38(1))
Price stability
(LSNBR  
Art.2(1)); 
regulation and 
supervision, 
payment systems 
and financial 
stability (LSNBR 
Arts.2(2)(b), 25(1) 
and 22(1))
Bank Board (management): Governor, 
Senior Deputy Governor and 2 Deputy 
Governors who are nominated by the 
Parliament (LSNBR Art.32); members 
are appointed by the Parliament on the 
recommendation of the competent 
standing committees of the two 
Chambers of Parliament (LSNBR 
Art.33(3))
Independent public 
institution (LSNBR 
Art.1);  Freedom from 
instructions (LSNBR 
Art.3(1))
Exceptional case-
by-case grant of 
loans (unsecured 
or secured with 
assets other than 
those provided by 
Art.19 (LSNBR 
Art.26)
Slovakia – Member since 2004 - Národná banka Slovenska
Legal person 
(ANBS311 Art.1(2)) 
and an independent 
institution, whose 
profits revert to the 
government (ANBS 
Art.38(2))
Price stability
(ANBS Art.2(1)); 
financial stability
(ANBS Art.2 (3)) 
and supervision
(ANBS 
Art.2(3)(a))
Bank Board (supreme governing body , 
which determines monetary policy): 
Governor, 2 Vice-Governors (appointed 
by the President of the Slovak Republic 
upon the recommendation of the 
Government and with approval of the 
National Council of the Slovak Republic 
-(ANBS Art.7(2)), and 8 other members 
(appointed by the Government upon the 
recommendation of the Governor –
Art.7(3)) of which at most 3
do not have to be employees of the 
National Bank of Slovakia (ANBS Art.6 
and 7)
Independent central 
bank (ANBS Art.1(1)); 
Freedom from 
instructions (ANBS 
Art.12(1)) but the 
Governor must inform 
the Government of the  
conclusions form 
meetings of the Bank 
Board and its adopted 
decisions (ANBS 
Art.12(2)).
Exceptional short-
term ELA loan, 
secured by 
sufficient 
collateral, with 
preferential 
repayment rights to 
the NBS (ANBS 
Art.24) 
Slovenia – Member since 2004 - Banka Slovenije
Autonomous 
institution under 
public law; wholly 
owned by the State
(BSA312 Art.1)
Price and 
financial stability
(BSA Art.4);
regulation and 
supervision
(Arts.12(9) and 23)
Governor and Vice-governors: 
nominated by the President and 
appointed by the National Assembly 
(BSA Arts.35 and 36)
Governing Board: appointed by the 
National Assembly on nomination by the 
President (BSA Art.37)
Independence and 
freedom from 
instructions (BSA 
Art.2); financial and 
administrative
autonomy (Art.1(1)).
Liquidity 
management (BSA 
Art.11(3))
Spain – Member since 1986 - Banco de España
Nationalised since 
1962313; institution
under public law
with own legal 
Price stability
(LABdE Art.7(2)); 
payments system
(Art. 7(3)d); 
Governing Council: Governor 
(appointed by the King on President’s 
proposal - LABdE Art.24(1)), Deputy 
Governor (appointed by the government 
Autonomy and 
freedom from 
instruction (LABdE 
Preamble and Art.1)
                                                
310 Law No. 312 / 28.06.2004 on the Statute of the National Bank of Romania
311 Act on the National Bank of Slovakia available at http://www.nbs.sk/_img/Documents/LEGA/a5661992.pdf
312 Banka Slovenije Act (Official consolidated version ZBS-1-UPB1)
313 http://www.bde.es/webbde/en/secciones/sobreelbanco/historia/historia.html#1998
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NCB Legal 
Status and 
Ownership 
Structure
Statutory policy 
objectives and 
functions
Corporate Governance Structure 
Provisions for NCB 
Independence
Provisions for 
LOLR 
personality and full 
public and private 
legal capacity, 
subject to private 
law except when 
exercising the 
administrative 
authority 
conferred on it by 
this and other laws 
(LABdE314 Art.1)
Financial stability
(LABdE 
Art.7(5)(b)).
on Governor’s proposal - LABdE 
Art.24(2)), 6 Council members 
(appointed by the government on Finance 
Minister – Art.24(3)),  Director-General 
of the Treasury and Financial Policy, and 
Vice-president of the National Securities 
Market Commission (LABdE Art.20)
Executive Commission: Governor and 
Deputy Governor, 2 Council members 
(appointed by the Governing Council, on 
Governor’s proposal, from the Council's 
elected members – Art.24(4)), and the 
Directors-General of the Bank with no 
voting powers (LABdE Art.22)
Sweden – Member since 1995 - Sveriges Riksbank
Public authority
under the Riksdag 
(the Swedish 
Parliament) (SRA315
Ch.1 Art.1; Ch.9 
Art.13)
Price stability; 
payments system
(SRA Art.2)
General Council: 11 members elected 
by the Riksdag (SRA Ch.1 Art.3 and 
Ch.9 Art.13)  who cannot hold political 
positions (SRA Ch.2) 
Executive Council: (manages the 
Riksbank) appointed by the General 
Council (SRA Ch.9 Art.13), who cannot 
hold political positions (SRA Ch.3)
Freedom from 
instructions (SRA Ch.3 
Art.2); No public 
authority may 
determine how the 
Riksbank shall decide 
in matters of monetary 
policy (Ch.9 Art.13)
LOLR: credits or 
guarantees on 
special terms in 
exceptional 
circumstances 
(SRA Ch.6 Art.8)
United Kingdom – Member since 1973 – Bank of England
Independent public 
organisation wholly 
owned by the 
Government since 
its nationalisation by 
the BoE Act 1946
Monetary 
Stability (BoEA316
Art.11; MoU317
§2);  Financial 
Stability
(introduced by the 
Banking Act 2009; 
MoU §2)
Court of Directors (management and 
monetary policy): Governor, 2 Deputy 
Governors and  directors appointed by 
Her Majesty (BoE Act 1998, Art.1)
Monetary Policy Committee (monetary 
policy formulation): Governor and 
Deputy Governors, 2 members appointed 
by the Governor after consultation with 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and 4 
members appointed by the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer. (BoE Act 1998, Art.13)
Financial Stability Committee (since 
2009): Governor and Deputy Governors 
of the Bank, 4 directors of the Bank 
appointed by the chair of the court of 
directors and a Treasury representative 
without voting rights.
Freedom from 
instructions in relation 
to monetary policy 
(BoE Act 1998, Art.10); 
Treasury has no 
operational 
responsibility for the 
activities of the Bank 
and shall not be 
involved, but the Bank 
must alert it in some 
circumstances (MoU 
§5); Financial Crisis 
Management: for 
operations beyond the 
Bank’s published 
framework, ultimate 
responsibility rests with 
the Chancellor (MoU 
§14) 
Liquidity 
maintenance (MoU 
§17(ii)); in 
exceptional 
circumstances 
other operations in 
accordance with 
MoU §§13-14  
(MoU §2(iv)); 
Special 
Resolution 
Regime except  
temporary public 
ownership (BA 
2009 SRR CoP318
§4.3)
                                                
314 LAW OF AUTONOMY OF THE BANCO DE ESPAÑA Law 13/1994, of 1 June 1994
315 The Sveriges Riksbank Act (Lag (1988:1385) om Sveriges riksbank) as from 1 June 2010
316 Bank of England Act 1998
317 Memorandum of Understanding between HM Treasury, the Bank of England and the Financial Services Authority
318 Banking Act 2009 Special Resolution Regime Code of Practice
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ANNEX I
Member State
Legal Status
Ownership 
Structure
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and Tasks
Corporate 
Governance
Structure
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Austria • • •i • • • • • •
Belgium • • • i • • • • •
Bulgaria • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Cyprus • • • • • • • • • •ii •
Czech Republic • • • i • • • • • • • • •
Denmark • • • • i • • •iii •
Estonia • • i • i • • •
Finland • • • • • • • • •
France • • • • • • • •
Germany • • • • • • • • • •
Greece • • • • • • • • •
Hungary • • • i • • • • •iv
Ireland • • • i • • • i
Italy • • • • • • • •
Latvia • • • • • • • • • •
Lithuania • • • • • • •
Luxembourg • • • i i • • • • •
Malta • • • • • • • •
The Netherlands • • • • • • • i
Poland • • • • • • i i
Portugal • • • i • • • • • • • •
Romania • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Slovakia i • i • • • • • • • •
Slovenia • • • • • • • • • • •
Spain • • • • • • • • • •
Sweden • • • • • • i • •
United Kingdom • • • • •v • • i • • •vi
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KEY:
• Provision present in the legislation governing the NCB (whether an Act, a Statute, an Organic Law or 
a provision of the Constitution).
i No express provision is found in the legislation, but it is implied either in other provisions or through 
a fact such as the membership of the ESCB.
Notes to the table:
                                                
i State had a 70% stake during the financial crisis; Bank was nationalised in May 2010
ii Reference is made to financial independence necessary for the achievement of the objectives of the Bank
iii Historically independent of political organizations from the introduction of the Denmarks Nationalbank Act in 1936
iv “[U]nder the circumstances that jeopardise the stability of the financial system, an emergency loan may be advanced 
subject to performance of actions by the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority or performance of actions by the credit 
institution, at the proposal of the Supervisory Authority” (Act on the MNB Ch.II Art.14)
v Introduced by the Banking Act 2009
vi Restrictions on the Bank’s ability to do this apply – see MOU
